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Buyer Status ·under the U.C.C.: A
Suggested Temporal Definition
David Frisch*

J.

INTRODUCTION

The recognition of private property requires a comprehensive and
systematic body of detailed rules to permit and control the transfer of
property .1 Although these rules must necessarily comprehend innumerable
transfer scenarios2 and force choices implicating difficult value judgments,
at the most basic level two problems must be confronted: (1) how to
accomplish a transfer of an item of property or an interest therein; and (2)
how to resolve competing claims to the same item or interest. To deal with
the former problem, one finds a history rich in rules clothed in ceremonial
garb. The play is everything: a transfer occurs only if properly performed.3
Assuming a transfer occurs, resolution of the latter problem often depends
on a family of rules, all born from what can best be described as the first
principle of Anglo-American property law: the transferee of property can
receive no greater interest than that possessed by the transferor.4 This
*Associate Professor of Law, Delaware Law School. J.D., 1975, University of Miami;
L.L.M., 1980, Yale Law School. The author wishes to acknowledge with thanks the summer
research grant so generously provided by the Delaware Law School.
1. Because not everyone is capable of producing the property they need or is capable of
consuming fully the property they have, any property's enjoyment and value must rest, in
part, on its transferability. One, therefore, finds that "[n]early all theories of private property
assume that an owner ... has the power to transfer it. Indeed, it is hard to envision a general
scheme of private property without transferability." Baird & Jackson, Information, Uncertainty,
and the Transfer of Property, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 299, 299 n.4 (1984).
2. Before being viewed as comprepensive, a set of transfer rules must, at a minimum,
provide workable methods for effecting a voluntary transfer of property, both antemortem
and postmortem, and to effect its involuntary transfer. A creditor with a claim against a debtor
should somehow be able to "get at" the value of the debtor's interest in property as a means
of satisfying that claim.
3. The reasons for particular ceremonies are as varied as the ceremonies themselves. For
example, an attempted gift of an item capable of delivery is invalid in the absence of its
delivery; if actual delivery is impractical, then a symbolic or constructive delivery is necessary.
See generally Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in Action
Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 ILL. L. REv. 341 (1926). One author has suggested that
"[t]he survival of the dogma is doubtless due to the perfectly reasonable desire on the part of
the courts to protect the property of the individual against ill-founded and fraudulent claims
of gift ...." R. BROWN, THE LAw OF PERSONAL PROPERlY § 7.2, at 78 (3d ed. 1975). On the other
hand, consider the formalities that often precede the involuntary transfer of possession of
property. Many of these formalities have their roots in the due process clauses of the
Constitution. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV§ 1. See, e.g., Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82
(1972) (in absence of extraordinary situations, notice and hearing must precede issuance of
writ of replevin).
4. This principle has also been labeled the "derivation principle," see D. BAIRD & T.
JACKSON, SECURllY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERlY 141 (1984), or, put in more eloquent terms:
"Title, like a stream, cannot rise higher than its source." Barthelmess v. Cavalier, 2 Cal. App.
2d 477, 487, 38 P.2d 484, 490 (1934).

531

532

463

IOWA LAW REVIEW

531

[1987]

Article examines one facet of one exception to this first principle.
It ha:; been trumpeted that "[t]he triumph of the good faith purchaser
has been one of the most dramatic episodes in our legal history." 5 With this
victory came the correlative commercial doctrine of good faith purchase, a
doctrine that allows for the chipping away of "security of ownership" in
favor of "security of purchase."6 The doctrine makes it possible for the
transferee of goods to receive under certain circumstances a property
interest superior to that of the transferor. 7
It is not surprising that such a doctrine, antithetical as it is to
traditional common-law theory, should have experienced difficulty establishing roots in the common law. 8 Not until the early part of the nineteenth
century and the sporadic passage of the nonuniform Factor's Acts was there
any show of support for the notion of a good faith purchase doctrine.9
Softening of the judicial bias in favor of ownership interests soon followed,
but was limited to situations in which the transferor had somehow acquired
voidable title from the true owner. Voidable title would ripen into good title
when the item was later acquired by a good faith purchaser. 10 With the
eventual codification of sales law, the good faith purchase doctrine found a

5. Gilmore, The Commercial Doctrine of Good Faith Purchase, 63 YALE L.J. 1057, 1057 (1954).
6. For a discussion of this conflict, see generally Dolan, The U.C.C. Framework: Conveyancing Principles 1znd Property Interests, 59 B. U .L. REV. 811 (1979); Gilmore, The Good Faith Purchase
Ideci and the Uniform Commercial Cade: Confessions of a Repentant Draftsman, 15 GA. L. REv. 605
(1931); Gilmore, supra note 5; Hawkland, Curing an Improper Tender of Title to Chattels: Past,
Present and Commercial Code, 46 MINN. L. REv. 697 (1962); Warren, Cutting Off Claims of
Ownership Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. Cm. L. REv. 469 (1963); Weinberg, Markets
Overt, Vo1dabl1 Titles, and Feckless Agents: judges and Efficiency in the Antebellum Doctrine of Good
Faith Purchast, 56 TuL. L. REv. 1 (1981).
When the transferor's title is imperfect because it is subject to an outstanding interest, the
tension betm·en security of ownership and security of purchase is readily apparent. To limit
the transferee's title to that of the transferor keeps alive the outstanding interest and secures
its ownership Conversely, to secure the purchase, a rule is needed that permits the transferee
to take free of the interest, resulting in its termination. Whichever approach is taken, someone
loses.
7. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-307. Although the scope of this Article is limited to transactions in
goods, the good faith purchase doctrine is not. See generally Gilmore, supra note 5.
8. See Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1057. Returning to the beginning of the story, "[t]he initial
common law 'Position was that equities of ownership are to be protected at all costs: an owner
may never be· deprived of his property rights without his consent." Id. The first exception
carved into this maxim was the English doctrine of "market overt." As early as the sixteenth
century, purchasers of goods would take free of all third party claims provided that the
purchase was made in an open fair or market. See generally 2 ·w. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES
*449-55; Pease, The Change oftlze Property in Goods by Sale in Market Ovl!1t, 8 COLUM. L. REv. 375
(1908); Weinberg, supra note 6. American jurisdictions frequently considered but always
rejected this ·~xception to the common law's veneration of existing property interests. See
Hawkland, su/rra note 6, at 698-700; Warren, supra note 6, at 470; Weinberg, supra note 6, at
5-15.
9. See Gilmore, supra note 5, at 1057-58. ("[A]nyone buying from a factor in good faith,
relying on his possession of the goods, and without notice of limitations on his authority, took
good title against the true owner.").
IO. See id. ,1t 1059-62. The transferor would acquire voidable title and hence the power to
transfer good title in those cases in which the true owner, although defrauded, had
nevertheless intended to part with title to the goods. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 17.
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home in the Uniform Sales Act 11 and. now tesides in the Uniform
Commercial Code (the Code or U.C.C.). 12
Sparsed throt].ghout the Code one finds several characters with
different names, but all entitled under appropriate circumstances to good
faith purchase treatment. 13 The primary focus of this Article is on "one of
the favorites in the dramatis personae of the UCC" 14 : the buyer in ordinary
course of business. In particular, the Article asks when during the life of a
sales transaction will a purchaser qualify as a protected buyer? On this
temporal issue, as well as on others, the Code is conspicuously silent. 15
This Article attempts two different but complementary tasks. First, it
offers an answer to the "by no means academic question" 16 asked above. In
so doing, the Article considers Code rules that affect the buyer-seller
relationship and those that impact on the interests of third parties. The
conclusion reached is that buyer status occurs at the moment the purchaser
obtains the remedial right to the goods vis-a-vis the seller.17 In most
11. The sections of the UNIFORM SALES Acr, 1 U.L.A. 1 (1950) (act withdrawn 1962) relevant
to this discussion are:
(1) Subject to the provisions of this act, where goods are sold by a person who is not
the owner thereof, and who does not sell them under the authority or with the
consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no better title to the goods than the seller
had, unless the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded from denying the
seller's authority to sell.
Id. § 23, 1 U.L.A. at 379.
Where the seller of goods has a voidable title thereto, but his title has not been
avoided at the time of the sale, the buyer acquires a good title to the goods, provided
he buys them in good faith, for value, and without notice of the seller's defect of title.
Id. § 24, 1 U.L.A. at 387.
Where a person having sold goods continues in possession of the goods, or of
negotiable documents of title to the goods, the delivery or transfer by that person, or
by an agent acting for him, of the goods or documents of title under any sale, pledge,
or other disposition thereof, to any person receiving and paying value for the same
in good faith and without notice of the previous sale, shall have the same effect as if
the person making the delivery or transfer were expressly authorized by the owner of
the goods to make the same.
Id. § 25, 1 U.L.A. at 390.
12. Unless otherwise indicated, all references and citations to "the Code" or "U.C.C." in this
Article are to the text and comments of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL ConE (1978) (official text with
comments).
13. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403 (2) (buyer in ordinary course); 3-302 (holder in due course);
7-501 (holder to whom negotiable document of title has been duly negotiated); 8-302 (bona
fide purchaser). These characters and others receive their favorable treatment in U.C.C. §§
2-403(1), 2-403(2), 2-702(3), 2-706(5), 3-119(1), 3-207(2), 3-305, 3-406, 3-407, 3-602, 5-114(2),
6-110(2), 7-205, 7-208, 7-209(3), 7-210(5), 7-308(4), 7-502(1), 7-503(3), 7-504(2)-(3), 8-205,
8-206(1), 8-302(3), 8-311, 9-301(1), 9-306(2), 9-307(1)-(2), 9-308, 9-309, 9-504(4).
14. Skilton, Buyer in Ordinary Caurse ofBusiness Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code
(and Related Matters), 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1, 2.
15. Others have struggled with the issue of "when" in other contexts. See, e.g., Anzivino,
When Does a Debtor Have Rights in the Collateral Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code?,
61 MARQ. L. REv. 23 (1977); Carlson & Shupack,]udicial Lien Priorities Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Part 1, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 287, 299-317 (1984) (discussing when
person becomes lien creditor for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-301(1)).
16. Skilton, supra note 14, at 15; see also Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 264, 487 A.2d 953, 957 (1985) ("The point at which a person
becomes a buyer in ordinary course is subji:ct to considerable controversy because the Code
does not specify the moment at which the status is conferred.").
17. See infra text accompanying notes 242-62.
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instances, therefore, buyer status will inevitably coincide with the moment
the remedy of specific performance or, in some cases, replevin becomes
available to the buyer. The Article's second purpose is descriptive. It looks
behind the rhetoric of the buyer status cases to see how their resolution
compares, in fact, with those cases in which the only issue is the buyer's
right to obtain possession of the goods from the seller. It then considers
whether harmonization of these two lines of cases is possible. 1s

II.

THE NEED FOR A TEMPORAL DEFINITION

Section 1-201(9) of the Code is the definitional source of buyer in
ordinary course of business:
[A] person who in good faith and without knowledge that the
sale to him is in violation of the ownership rights or security
interest of a third party in the goods buys in ordinary course from
a person in the business of selling goods of that kind but does not
include a pawnbroker. All persons who sell minerals or the like
(including oil and gas) at wellhead or minehead shall be deemed
to be persons in the business of selling goods of that a kind.
"Buying" may be for cash or by exchange of other property or on
securc::d or unsecured credit and includes receiving goods or
documents or title under a pre-existing contract for sale but does
not include a transfer in bulk or as security for or in total or partial
satisfaction of a money debt. 19
This definition and its location within the Code suggest two questions, the
answers to which bear directly on the scope of this Article.
If one assumes that the purchase, prior to its interruption, was
proceeding "in good faith" and "in ordinary course from a person in the
business of selling goods of that kind," then the only task remaining is to
determine if buyer status has been reached. Yet the buyer in ordinary
course is not the Code's only buyer of goods who is privileged by receiving
good faith purchase treatment. Sometimes the privileged buyer is simply
the good faith purchaser.2° Here the Code's nomenclature must be used
with care. Sections 1-201(32) and (33) define "purchaser" as a person who
obtains an interest in property as the result of any "voluntary transaction."21 Thus, the term includes and encompasses characters in addition to
the usual buyer. When, howeve.r, the person claiming to be a purchaser is
18. See infra text accompanying notes 263-73.
19. u.c.c. § 1-201(9).
20. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-403(1). This is, perhaps, the Code's most notorious purchaser
prO\•ision. The subsection begins by sheltering the purchaser's title, giving the purchaser "all
title which his transferor had or had power to transfer ... ."Id. But the purchaser's title is not
nec.;:ssarily limited to that of its transferor. By using the term "power to transfer" the
sub~ection "ccntinue[s] unimpaired all rights acquired under the law of agency or of apparent
agency or ownership or other estoppel, whether based on statutory provisions or on case law
principles." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1. Finally it concludes by recognizing the "voidable title"
doccrine, see st!pra note 10 and accompanying text, providing "specifically for the protection of
the good faith purchaser for value in a number of specific situations which have been
troublesome under prior law." U.C.C. § 2-403 comment 1.
21. u.c.c. § 1-201(32)-(33).
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also a buyer, should the formula for determining buyer in ordinary course
status be used even though the purchase is not in the ordinary course?
Although particular statutory language may make consistent harmonization difficult,22 the test should be the same absent a clear statutory or
policy-mandated push in a different direction. 23
Because the question of buyer in ordinary course status is made
relevant by several Code sections,24 one must similarly ask whether the
determination of that status should vary with the particular section. It
would appear that by placing the definition in Article I, the drafters
intended for uniform construction of the term "buyer in the ordinary
course."25 Moreover, no reason appears for defining the same status
differently when it has the same effect of cutting off third party property
interests. 26 This conclusion does not, however, preclude imposing requirements in addition to buyer in ordinary course status as a requisite to
favorable treatment when special or different policy considerations are
involved. 27 Section 7-205, for example, refers to "[a] buyer in the ordinary
22. For example, U.C.C. § 2-403(1) speaks in terms of "title" but the various buyer in
ordinary course provisions do not. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2) (buyer receives "rights" of
entruster); 9-307(1) (buyer takes "free" of security interest). For the full text of both
subsections, see infra note 24. On this basis, an argument can be fashioned that for a buyer to
achieve purchaser status under§ 2-403(1), title must pass, whereas buyer status under other
provisions is not necessarily dependant upon the location of title. The temptation of the
approach is rejected in Leary & Sperling, The Outer limits of Entrusting, 35 ARK. L. R£v. 50,
81-83 (1981).
23. See infra note 262.
24. A determination of this status is most frequently required under U.C.C. §§ 2-403(2)
and 9-307(1). The former provides: "Any entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who
deals in goods of that kind gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in
ordinary course of business." U.C.C. § 2-403(2). The latter provides:
A l:iuyer in ordinary course of business (subsection (9) of Section 1-201) other than a
person buying farm products from a person engaged in farming operations takes free
of a security interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows of its existence.
u.c.c. § 9-307(1).
25. Absent different or additional definitions elsewhere in the Code, the title and preamble
to U.C.C. § 1-201 make it clear that, "unless the context otherwise requires," § 1-201
definitions are to apply throughout the Code. The definition of "buyer in the ordinary course"
would be particularly inappropriate for "otherwise" treatment because the drafters would have
provided, but did not, alternative definitions of the term when making it relevant to the
operation of different Code sections.
26. It is true that the degree of sympathy one feels for the party whose interest is being
divested will often be greater under U.C.C. § 2-403(2) (unsophisticated consumer entruster)
than under U.C.C. § 9-307(1) (sophisticated commercial lender). Although this difference may
initially have called for a different statutory response, it does not call for dissimilar
construction of identical statutory language. As one commentator aptly put it: "[T]here is
much to be said for the proposition that the question whether a person is a buyer in ordinary
course of business should be answered irrespective of its setting under section 2-403(2) or
9-307(1)." Skilton, supra note 14, at 38. For a case reflecting this attitude, see Big Knob
Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 264-68, 487 A.2d 953,
957-59 (1985) (cases and commentary involving buyer status under § 9-307(1) referred to
without distinction to support finding of buyer status under § 2-403(2)).
27. One other point of potential variance between§ 2-403(2) and other buyer in ordinary
course provisions should be mentioned. To qualify as a buyer in ordinary course one must act
in "good faith," a term the Code defines as "honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction
concerned." U.C.C. § 1-201(19). The Code further refines this definition by requiring of a
merchant not only honesty in fact but also "the observance of reasonable commercial
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course of business of fungible goods sold and delivered by a warehouseman
.... "28 Because this section implicates policies not at work in other sections,
a delivery requirement exists.29 This added requirement should not he
confused with buyer status, the timing of which is the same as under other
sections, but should be seen as an additional requirement to that status.3 0
As the preceding discussion has shown, the question of whether one
has qualified as a buyer can manifest itself when any one of several Code
sections is applicable, including those that protect the interests of good faith
purchasers.3 1 The context in which most courts have been forced to answer
this question, however, has been in the application of U.C.C. section
9-307(1).3 :! Therefore, it seems fitting to use that section to illustrate the
scope and importance of the problem.
Section 9-307(1) is but one of the Code's numerous exceptions to the
presumptive effectiveness of a security interest. 33 The section provides that
standards of fair dealing in the trade." U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(b). Because the Article 2 refinement
of good faith expressly applies only to that article, see U.C.C. § 2-103(1), one must ask whether
a merchant buyer claiming ordinary course status under a section in another Code article is
held to a lower standard of good faith. On this point it should come as no surprise that the
courts are not in accord. Compare Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d
743, 751 (3d Cir. 1979) (§ 2-103(l)(b) does not apply to Article 9 cases) and General Elec.
Credit Corp. v. Humble, 532 F. Supp. 703, 706 (M.D. Ala. 1982) (same) and Sherrock v.
Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 651 (Del. 1972) ("We find no basis anywhere for the
conclusion that the drafters of the Code intended to make it permissible to 'cross over' to
Article 2 for the definition of the term 'good faith' as incorporated by reference in Article 9.")
aiul Massey-Ferguson, Inc. v. Helland, 105 Ill. App. 3d 648, 653, 434 N.E.2d 295, 297-98
(1982) (rejecting argument that Article 2 good faith definition applies in Article 9 transaction)
with Swift v. J.I. Case Co., 266 So. 2d 379, 381 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (objective standard
of U.C.C. § ~!-103(l)(b) applicable for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-307(1)).
28. u.c.c:. § 7-205.
29. As Professors Leary and Sperling explained,
[a] different policy from that of U.C.C. § 9-307(1) may be at work where stored
fungible goods are concerned, as U.C.C. § 7-207(1) permits commingling, and, in the
case of an "overissue," a loss is shared by all of the owners in common of the
commini~led mass. When there has been a delivery to a BIOCOB [buyer in ordinary
course of business] out of the commingled mass, thus causing an "overissue" ... will
there be'a need to pro-rate a remainder among the holders of warehouse receipts. If
there has been no delivery to the BIOCOB, U.C.C. §§ 7-205 and 7-207(2) indicate
that the risk of the warehouseman's 'l\Tongdoing must be borne by the potential
BIOCOB of the goods ....
Leary & Sperling, supra note 22, at 79-80 n.67.
30. Wher.~ there is, as in the case of U.C.C. § 7-205, a delivery requirement, the question
of when buy.~r status is achieved largely disappears. Because delivery will usually signal the
completion of the seller's transfer obligation and the removal of the goods from the seller's
po~session, it would be implausible, at that point, to maintain that buyer status is lacking.
31. Whether the course of buying has progressed to such a degree that the buyer's interest
should be protected from those with claims against the seller is an issue that also transcends the
Code. For example, an essentially non-Code dispute involving the same question could occur
between a bLfer and a judicial lien creditor of the seller.
32. For llhat is probably the best and most complete discussion to date of U.C.C. §
9-307(1), see generally Skilton, supra note 14. It should be emphasized that although §
9·307(1) is tte section that most frequently necessitates a determination of buyer status, it is
not the only section. See, e.g., Schneider v.J.W. Metz Lumber Co., 715 P.2d 329, 333 (Colo.
191!6) (deciding buyer status under§ 2-403(2)); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 267-68, 437 A.2d 953, 958-59 (1935) (same).
33. Section 9-201 provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided by this Act a security
agreement is effective according to its terms between the parties, against purchasers of the

A SUGGESTED TEMPORAL DEFINITION

537

"[a] buyer in the ordinary course of business ... takes free of a security
interest created by his seller even though the security interest is perfected
and even though the buyer knows ofits existence."34 When section 9-307(1)
applies, the original security interest "dies,"35 a new security interest in
identifiable proceeds received by the debtor is born,36 and the buyer goes
merrily along. Because the value of the security interest in the proceeds will
usually equal or exceed that of the original collateral, the secured party
should, theoretically, have no reason to complain about the Code's particular allocation of interests. The secured party's contentment, however,
presupposes two conditions. The first is that the proceeds remain identifiable37 and available. 38 Second, that, excluding the value of the goods that
were the subject of the transaction between the seller and the buyer, the
secured party is fully secured at the time it elects to exercise its rights upon
the seller's default.39
Consider, for example, the much commented upon conflict between
the Code's second class citizen,40 the prepaying buyer, and the secured
creditor.41 For whatever reason, and many are possible, the buyer makes
the decision to pay part or all of the purchase price without taking delivery
of the goods. 42 If the goods are still in the seller's possession when the
collateral and against creditors." U.C.C. § 9-201. Thus, unless some exception exists a secured
creditor prevails against all other parties. Unfortunately for the secured creditor, the Code
provides a host of exceptions scattered throughout Part 3 of Article 9. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§
9-307, 9-308, 9-309, 9-310, 9-312, 9-313, 9-314, 9-315. Moreover, "despite 9-20l's bold
assertion that only other provisions in the Uniform Commercial Code override it, obviously
other statutory law (such as the Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code) must be
considered." D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 367-68.
34. u.c.c. § 9-307(1).
35. For an intriguing attempt to distinguish between a security interest's death and its
subordination in Article 9, see generally Carlson, Death and Subordination Under Article 9 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Senior Buyers and Senior Lien Creditors, 5 CARDOZO L. REv. 547 (1984).
36. See U.C.C. § 9-306(2).
37. The question whether proceeds are identifiable may arise in a multitude of contexts but
is most frequently encountered when cash proceeds are in some way commingled with funds
from other sources. See generally Skilton, The Secured Party's Rights in a Debtor's Bank Account
Under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 1977 S. ILL. U.L.J. 120.
38. Irrespective of the particular controls placed on the debtor's activities by the secured
party, the risk of debtor misbehavior is always present. For an explanation of secured credit
premised on this observation, see Jackson & Kronman, Secured Financing and Priorities Among
Creditors, 88 YALE L.J. 1143, 1149-58 (1979).
39. If the disposition value of all collateral within the seller's possession is insufficient to
satisfy fully the seller's obligation, the secured party will have the incentive to increase that
value by also laying claim to collateral previously transferred to third parties.
40. This characterization is borrowed from Gordon, The Prepaying Buyer: Second Class
Citizenship Under Uniform Commercial Code Article 2, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 565, 565 (1968).
41. See generally id.; Jackson & Kronman, A Plea for the Financing Buj·er, 85 YALE L.J. 1
(1975); Speidel, Advance Payments in Contracts for Sale of Manufactured Goods: A U:Jok at the
Uniform Commercial Code, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 281 (1964).
42. See, e.g., Thompson v. McMaster, (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 418 (N.D.
Tex. 1982) (good not yet completed by seller); International Harvester Credit Corp. v.
Associates Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 491, 211 S.E.2d 430, 432 (1974) (tractor truck held
by seller pending buyer's acquisition-"Of trailers); Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 113 Ill. App.
3d 87, 89-90, 446 N.E.2d 525, 527 (1983) (pigs left with seller for care and finishing); Integrity
Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup.
Ct. 1977) (mobile home left with seller pending buyer's acquisition of lot); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 263, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 527 (Sup. Ct. 1968) (good held by
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secured party acquires the right and makes the decision to proceed against
its collateral, the secured party will, if undersecured, assert a security
interest in both the goods and their proceeds. If the secured party is
successful, the buyer loses any claim to the goods, suffers an immediate
out-of-pocket loss in the amount of the prepayment, and leaves the deal
with a damages claim of probably negligible value against the seller. On the
other hand, if the buyer's interest is protected by section 9-307(1), the buyer
receives the goods and the secured party loses a windfall for which it never
bargained.4 3 Moreover, the right to the goods is not the only right at stake.
If the buyer takes free of the security interest, the secured party faces the
risk of a conversion claim if the secured party acts as though the security
interest still exists.44 Thus, the buyer's status at the time the secured party
proceeds against the collateral is crucial to the outcome of this type of case.
Other potential scenarios requiring an inquiry into buyer status under
section 9-lW7(1) status deserve brief mention. In these, the section's role is
not to resolve a dispute between the secured party and the buyer but rather
to settle a dispute between competing secured parties.45
One scenario involves the competing claims of the seller's inventory
secured party (SP) and a purchaser of chattel paper.46 Suppose that the sale
to the buyer is financed initially by the seller, who receives from the buyer
a signed promissory note and a security interest in the goods to secure
payment of the note. This newly acquired chattel paper is then transferred
by the seller to someone other than SP. If, while the goods are still in the
seller's possession, either the seller or the buyer defaults on its secured
obligation, a question of priority ofliens is likely to arise between SP and the
chattel paper purchaser. SP will base its claim to the goods on the security
interest received directly from the seller, whereas the purchaser of the
chattel paper will claim priority on the basis of the security interest received
indirectly from the buyer.47 Although section 9-308 sorts out the two
seller pending buyer's receipt of ta.'t refund to be used for downpayment); Holstein v.
Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 213, 404A.2d 842, 843 (1979) (seller agreed to store
boat for winter). Further examples of why a seller might retain possession are set forth in
Gordon, supra note 40, at 566 n.4.
43. The term "windfall" seems appropriate because it is unlikely that the secured party's
expectations at the time the secured transaction was entered into encompassed a claim both to
an item of collateral and to its proceeds. This sentiment surfaced in Herman v. First Farmers
State Bank, '73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979), in which the court thought such a
result "would inequitably allow the inventory financer a double recovery." Id. at 481, 392
N.E.2d at 347.
44. See, e.g., Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'! Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 748 (3d Cir.
1979); Chryder Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 268-69, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 532-33
(Sup. Ct. 1908); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 145-47 (R.I. 1983).
45. See SH!ton, supra note 14, at 76. Professor Skilton refers to third party rights that are
dependent on the buyer's status as "satellite rights." Id.
46. Chattd paper is "a writing or writings which evidence both a monetary obligation and
a security interest in or a lease of specific goods .... " U.C.C. § 9-105(1)(b).
47. The regularity of this type of dispute can, without reference to reported cases, be
confirmed by the court's statement in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 263,
288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 528 (Sup. Ct. 1968) that "[s]ituations such as this are, moreover,
commonplace, according to counsel, in insolvent automobile dealerships and with major
appliance dealers." Id. at 263, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 528. For cases involving this issue, see, e.g., Rex
Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 176-77, 580 P.2d8, 8-9 (Ct.App. 1978); Wickes
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parties' relative rights to the chattel paper, it says nothing about rights to
the underlying goods. 48 If the course of the sale has reached the point at
which the buyer qualifies under section 9-307(1), then a priority rule is not
needed because conflicting security interests do not exist; SP no longer has
an interest in the goods and the chattel paper purchaser must necessarily
prevail.4 9 If, however, the buyer has not yet qualified for protection under
section 9-307(1), then, assuming no other section causes the death of SP's
interest,so SP's interest should have priority.s 1
A similar but conceptually distinct scenario emerges with only a slight
change of players. Instead of a buyer who purchases on credit, assume that
there is a buyer who pays cash that is provided by a third party lender
(Lender). To secure the loan, Lender receives from the buyer a security
interest in the goods. If either SP or Lender attempts to enforce its security

Corp. v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 363 So. 2d 56, 57-58 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978);
International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Assocs. Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211
S.E.2d 430, 433-34 (1974).
48. But see Borg-Warner Acceptance Corp. v. C.l.T. Corp., 679 S.W.2d 140, 144 (Tex. Ct.
App. 1984) (priority under§ 9-308 gives purchaser of chattel paper priority as to good).
49. Oddly enough, U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a) provides that the chattel paper purchaser's
repossession will cause SP's lien to reattach. Priority to the good will then depend on who has
priority to the chattel paper. See U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(b). If, however, SP wrongfully repossesses
following its loss of lien, the lien should not reattach. This distinction, unfortunately, was
overlooked in International Harvester Credit Corp. v. Assocs. Fin. Servs., 133 Ga. App. 488,
492, 211 S.E.2d 430, 433 (1974), and in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261,
269-70, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 533-34 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
50. The secured party must also be concerned with U.C.C. § 9-306(2). This subsection
terminates a security interest if the collateral's "disposition was authorized by the secured party
in the security agreement or otherwise .... "U.C.C. § 9-306(2). Because buyer in ordinary
course status under § 1-201 (9) requires a buyer to buy "from a person in the business of selling
goods of that kind," U.C.C. § 9-307(1) will apply primarily to inventory. This requirement
would suggest that most sales by the seller are "authorized" under § 9-306(2), with the b'uyer
taking free of the security interest without regard to U.C.C. § 9-307(1). This does not mean,
however, that the issue of when buyer status attaches loses its relevance. It would be
anomalous to conclude that a disposition has occurred for purposes ofU.C.C. § 9-306(2) prior
to the time buyer status is achieved for purposes of U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See infra note 262.
Moreover, the initial authorization of the seller's disposition is often conditional upon delivery
of proceeds to the secured party. When a delivery fails to take place, courts frequently deny
protection under U.C:C. § 9-306(2), thus forcing reliance on U.C.C. § 9-307(1). See, e.g.,
Northwest Livestock Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Coast Trading Co. (In re Coast Trading Co.), 31
Bankr. 670, 673 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (failure to deliver proceeds to secured party vitiates
consent); North Cent. Kan. Prod. Credit Ass'n v. Washington Sales Co., 223 Kan. 689, 696,
577 P.2d 35, 41 (1978) (failure to pay proceeds jointly to debtor and secured party vitiates
consent); Farmers State Bank v. Edison Non-Stock Coop. Ass'n, 190 Neb. 789, 794, 212
N.W.2d 625, 628-29 (1978) (debtor's default vitiates consent); Baker Prod. Credit Ass'n v.
Long Creek Meat Co., 266 Or. 643, 651, 513 P.2d 1129, 1133 (1973) (nonpayment of buyer's
draft vitiates consent).
51. Section 9-306(5)(c) would, in this case, have no role to play because SP's lien did not
reattach. Although it appears that U.C.C. § 9-312(5) is the appropriate priority rule to resolve
this dispute, at least one commentator has suggested that the first-to-file rule was never meant
to apply when, as here, two debtors are involved and that priority should in all cases be
awarded to SP. See B. CLARK, THE LAw OF SECURED TRANSACTIONS UNDER THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE § 3.8(4), at 3-53, 3-54 (1980). Not all courts, however, have accepted this
limitation on the scope ofU.C.C. § 9-312(5). See, e.g., National Bank of Commerce v. First Nat'!
Bank and Trust Co., 446 P.2d 277, 282 (Okla. 1968).
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interest before the goods leave the seller's possession and control,52 a
ranking of their respective claims will often be necessary. 53 As before, the
issue of who has the senior lien or, for that matter, whether there are in fact
competing· claims to the goods will depend on the buyer's status at the time
either party proceeds against the goods. Lender's interest should be
subordinate to that of SP, unless the latter's interest has ceased to exist.54
This, in tum, depends on whether the buyer has become a buyer for
purposes of section 9-307(1).

JII.

TEMPORAL DEFINITIONS AND THE COURTS

Having briefly outlined the typical contexts in which the need to
determine buyer status is likely to arise, it will be helpful to take a critical
look at how courts have decided buyer in ordinary cour.>e cases. What
results from this venture is, unfortunately, a vision of commercial law that
is unclear, uncertain, and that totally lacks a persuasive doctrinal foundation. To simplify discussion, consider the commonly accepted alternatives
for pinpointing the moment at which buyer status is achieved. They are (1)
the date of contract formation; (2) the date the goods are identified to the
contract;(:~) the date title to the goods passes to the buyer; and (4) the date
the buyer obtains possession of the goods.5 5 Note that these events are set
forth chronologically, mirroring the usual course of the transaction of a
sale. Note also that what results is a definitional spectrum running from
security of purchase to security of ownership.

A.

'

The Possession Date

At one end of the spectrum lies a rule requiring the buyer to take
possession of the goods in order to attain buyer status under the Code.56
52. Although the problem is beyond the scope of this Article, the statement in the text
assumes that at some point prior to the repossession the buyer had whatever quantum of
intC'rest is needed in the goods to constitute "rights in the collateral" so that Lender's security
interest was able to attach. See U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c). Not articulated in those cases involving a
purchaser of chattel paper, see supra text accompanying notes 46-51, but nevertheless implicit
in their holdings is the conclusion that that interest is not dependent upon the buyer's
pos!.ession. This view, however, has not been universally accepted. See Anzivino, supra note 15,
at 44-45 (sufficient "rights in the collateral'' hinges on buyer's possession) see also infra te.xt
accompanyin1~ notes 155-60, 201-06.
53. See, e.g., General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370,
377 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Hamilton County Bank v. Tuten, 250 So. 2d 17, 18-19 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1971); Crystal State Bank v. Columbia Heights State Bank, 295 Minn. 181, 182, 203
N.'W.2d 389, 390 (1973).
54. See supra note 49. Because a chattel paper purchaser is not involved in this scenario, if
SP'& lien was lost it cannot be regained under U.C.C. § 9-306(5)(a).
55. See Skilton, supra note 14, at 16; Note, The Buyer-Secured Party Conflict and Section
9-307(1) of th.1 U.C.C.: ldenti!Jing When a Buyer Qualifies for Protection as a BuJer in Ordinary
Course, 50 FmDHAM L. REv. 657, 662 (1982) [hereinafter Note, BuJer-Secured Party Conflict];
Note, Wltm D11es a Bu'Jer Become a Bu'Jerin Ordinary Course? U.C.C. §§ 1-201($1, 9-307(1): A Test
and a Proposal, 60 NEB. L. REV. 848, 852 (1981) [hereinafter Note, A Test and a Proposal].
56. A poliry justification for mandating possession by the buyer is based on the perceived
evih engendered by the seller's continued possession of goods now sut~ecr. to an interest of
whkh no public notice is given. See infra text accompanying notes 171-207. Because possession
is at the root of the problem, discussion often centers on a buyer's need to gain possession
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This rule is weighted heavily in favor of ownership interests. The chronological moment when the buyer's status becomes relevant is always when
progress of the transaction is terminally interrupted.57 Because, in the
typical case, the cause of the interruption is a repossession by the secured
party while the goods are still in the seller's possession, buyer status would
be invariably denied. If a consensus of judicial opinion exists in this area,
the consensus arguably is that a buyer need not take possession to qualify
as a buyer in the ordinary course of business;58 this conclusion is implicit in
some cases,59 explicit in others.60
Despite the initial perception of a clear judicial rejection of this end of
the definitional spectrum, there is one case that justifies a rethinking of this
commonly held assumption. In Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 61 the court
seemed to reject absolutely the notion that buyer status depends on
possession,62 but immediately retreated from this position in the very next
paragraph of the opinion:
While the Commercial Code ... does not require that in all
cases the buyer actually take delivery in order to have a buyer in
ordinary course of business status, sound policy considerations in
rather than on a seller's need to lose possession. Id. The latter situation, however, does not
depend upon the former. If, for example, the goods are to be shipped by the seller, loss of
possession will usually occur upon tender of delivery, see U.C.C. §§ 2-503(2), 2-504, yet the
buyer will not have gained possession until the goods are received. See U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(c).
Although the terms "delivery" and "possession" are not synonymous, see Mechanics Nat'! Bank
v. Goucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 148, 385 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co, v.
Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 858, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977),
they are often treated as such. Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 673
("Although the concepts thus are not synonymous, they are often used interchangeably.").
Absent a reason for distinguishing between "possession" and "delivery," this Article will use
the term "possession" expansively to include a tender of delivery where the seller has lost
possession.
57. See supra text accompanying notes 40-54.
58. See Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 673 ("Courts and commentators
routinely reject imposition of a delivery or receipt requirement ••.."); Note, U.C.C. Section
9-307(1) and the Non-Possessory Buyer: Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?, 19 GA. L. REv.
123, 139 (1984) [hereinafter Note, Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?] ("The courts
uniformly conclude that .•• one need not take possession of goods to be a buyer •.••"); Note,
A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 875 ("One area ofjudicial agreement ... is that delivery
and thus possession are unnecessary ....").
59. See, e.g., Sherrock v. Commercial Credit Corp., 290 A.2d 648, 650-51 (Del. 1972)
(without discussion of when buyer status attaches, court permitted buyers to take free of
security interest because it was not act of bad faith to leave goods with seller); Tanbro Fabrics
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 637, 350 N.E.2d 590, 592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d
260, 262 (1976) (without discussion of when buyer status attaches, court permitted buyer to
take free of security interest even though goods in possession of secured party).
60. See, e.g., Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 420 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. 1982); Rex: Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, 10 (Ct.
App. 1978); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 478, 392 N.E.2d 344,
345-46 (1979); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396
N.Y.S.2d 319, 321 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d 142, 148 (R.I.
1983).
61. 59 WIS. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973).
62. The Adamatic coun first said: "It seems clear that, if there is a sale and the buyer has
obtained title to the goods, his status as a buyer in ordinary course will not be defeated merely
because he has not taken possession." Id. at 239, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
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the instant situation would seem to dictate that the rights of a
secured creditor ought not be impaired in the absence of a
physical transfer or assignment of the goods.63
The Adamatic court's rationale is familiar. If the seller were permitted
to retain, as part of its inventory, property no longer subject to the secured
party's lien, the secured party could not rely on the status of that
inventory.64 This thinking smacks of the law's historical sensitivity to the
separation of ownership and possession, now frequently referred to as the
"ostensible ownership" problem. 65
It is particularly difficult to understand why the court picked this case
to embrace openly what is so clearly a prosecured party position. 66 Contrary
to the situation in most cases, the secured party in Adamatic actively
participated throughout the entire course of the sales transaction and was
not misled by the seller's retention of possession. 67 If the "instant situation"
referred to by the court6 8 is one that requires a transfer of the goods, then
it is hard to imagine one that would not. 69 Because Adamatic departs so
63. Id. at 240, 208 N.W.2d at 107.
64. Accorci.ing to the court, "the Code generally gives preference to property interests
which are evidenced either by recording or possession and that, to adopt the view of Chrysler,
the financier •Jf an inventory would no longer be able to rely on recorded interests and the
status of his debtor's inventory." Id., 208 N.W.2d at 107.
65. For more on this problem and the potential role, if any, ostensible ownership concerns
should play in pinpointing when buyer status is achieved, see infra text accompanying notes
171-207. For now, it is sufficient that other courts have routinely rejected the secured party's
assertion that the integrity of the debtor's inventory as a source of information must be
maintained. The court's response in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288
N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct. 1968) is typical: "If there is a usage of trade which exposes an
en truster on floor plan to certain risks, these are risks against which he can guard by audits and
accounting procedures or he can refuse to knowingly expose himself to the risk with the
particular dealer." For a similiar point of view, see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119
Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d 8, IO (1978); Farmers State Bank v. Webel, 113 Ill. App. 3d 87, 94-95,
446 N.E.2d 525, 530 (1983); Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 480-81,
392 N.E.2d 344, 347 (1979); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 216-17, 404
A.2d 842, 84!• (1979). In the foregoing cases there was no evidence that the creditor had
actually relied on the debtor's physical inventory. The secured party, however, fared no better
when such evidence did exist. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes,
Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Wilson v. M & W Gear, llO Ill. App. 3d 538,
543-44, 442 N.E.2d 670, 673-74 (1982).
(i6. Althou;jh one commentator suggested "that the secured party should not have his cake
and eat it too." Skilton, supra note 14, at 17 n.50, that was the secured party's fortune in
Adamatic. The secured party obtained the progress payments made by Chrysler and was also
permitted to lay claim to the subject matter of the sale. Even the court's conscience seemed
slightly troubled: "From the viewpoint of equity, this is an unsatisfactory result, for the record
shows that ... Chrysler had substantially paid the contract price for all the goods involved."
59 Wis. 2d at 241-42, 208 N.W.2d at 108. But the court's conscience was soothed by the
observation that a prepaying buyer has means of self-protection. Id. at 242, 208 N.W.2d at 108.
("The Code, however, gives broad latitude whereby a prepaying buyer, acting timely, can enter
into suitable arrangements for his own protection."). Unfortunately for the buyer, this
protection might not be as easily attainable as the court would lead us to believe. See generally
sources cited sapra note 41.
67. In fact, it was upon the secured party's suggestion that the buyer agreed to make
progress payments on the contract. 59 Wis. 2d at 225-26, 208 N.W.2d at 100.
63. See supra text accompanying note 63.
69. The di~cussion so far has centered on the Adamatic court's resolution of conflicting
rights with respect to only one contract of sale when the case actually involved two. The buyer
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dramatically from what would otherwise be a uniform judicial position, it is
tempting to pass it off as a decisional aberration without much precedential
value. 70 That, however, would be a mistake. The case has been discussed
too often by both courts and scholars to ignore it.71

B.

The Contract Date

At the security of purchase end of the spectrum, one possibility is
that attainment of buyer status could occur concurrently with the formation
of the sales contract. 72 It is difficult to say whether there are cases
supporting this view. 73 A major problem in drawing conclusions about
these cases, aside from piercing the opaqueness of their language,74 is that
each case is inextricably entwined with its facts, facts that may or may not
be legally relevant.
To illustrate, consider two opinions emanating from the same Illinois
appellate court. In the first case, Herman v. First Farmers State Bank,75 the
buyer contracted to purchase fertilizer, paid the full purchase price, but did
not take possession. Then, true to form, the seller's secured creditor
appeared, took possession of and sold the inventory of fertilizer, including
the buyer's unsp~cified share. The buyer brought suit to recover from the

was permitted to take free of the secured party's interest in the goods covered by the so-called
"first contract" under which the buyer actually received the goods and title passed. The goods,
however, subsequently were returned to the seller for alterations but, according to the court,
the secured party's lien never reattached because the seller never reacquired rights in those
goods. 59 Wis. 2d at 233-34, 208 N.W.2d at 104;. Notice that while the goods were in the seller's
possession their potential to mislead the secured party was the same as though they had never
been removed. Curiously, the court never addressed this point.
70. The court's emphasis on ostensible ownership is the crucial factor that separates this
case from others. If the opinion is read to require no more than that title must pass before
buyer status attaches, then the court does enjoy judicial company. See infra notes 105-17 and
accompanying text.
71. See, e.g., Gary Aircraft Corp. v. General Dynamics Corp., 681 F.2d 365, 374 (5th Cir.
1982); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 378 (D.
Del. 1985); Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.), 16 Bankr. 417, 420 (N.D. Tex.
1982); Integrity Ins. Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western, 90 Misc. 2d 868, 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d
319, 321 (1977); Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 Bankr. 458, 462 (D. Mass.
1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257,
264-65, 487 A.2d 953, 957 (1985); Anzivino, supra note 15, at 37; Baird & Jackson, Possession
and Ownership: AnExaminatian ofthe Scope ofArticle 9, 35 STAN. L. REv. 175, 210 (1983); Coogan,
Article 9-An Agenda for the Next Deco.de, 87 YALE LJ. 1012, 1034 (1978); Jackson, Embodiment
of Rights in Goods and the Concept of Chattel Paper, 50 U. Cm. L. REv. 1051, 1072 (1983);Jackson
& Kronman, supra note 41, at 27; Skilton, supra note 14, at 16; Skilton, Security Interests in
After-Acquired Property Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 19 Wis. L. REv. 925, 951.
72. This section will disprove the observation that "[t]he time of contracting, the earliest
point at which a buyer could conceivably sever a secured party's security interest, is usually not
seriously considered as an alternative." Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 675.
73. One court, however, explicitly rejected time of contracting as a suitable test. See
Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 238-41, 208 N.W.2d 97, 106-07 (1973).
74. See Waits, Values, Intuitions, and Opinion Writing: The Judicial Process and State Court
jurisdiction, 1983 U. ILL. L. REv. 917, 935 ("Even if all judges were Solomons, and all opinions
were written in the grandest of the Grand Style, problems would remain, for no amount of
wisdom or effort can eliminate completely the ambiguity of words.").
75. 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979).
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secured party the amount paid to the seller, asserting buyer in ordinary
course status under section 9-307(1).76
Rejecting the applicability of the Code's passage-of-title rules, the
Hennan court instead chose to believe that "the focus in a case such as this
should be on the 'ordinary course of business' requirement of section
9-307."77 Because the transaction bet\veen buyer and seller was customary,
the buyer prevailed. Although the opinion can be read as adopting a time
of contracting approach, it can also be read as requiring more than just a
mere contract. It bears repeating that cases cannot be read in isolation from
their facts.18 In Herman the goods arguably were identified to the contract79
and the purchase price was paid; one cannot say whether either fact is
relevant.
In the:· second case, Will-on v. M & W Gear, 8 0 the Illinois court refused
to deviate from Herman even though the good that the buyer had
purchased had not yet been identified to the contract Vlhen the secured
party took possession. Will-on involved the purchase of a grain drill for
which the buyer had paid in full. When the secured party took possession,
the seller had an inventory of only two drills, one of which was earmarked
for delivery to a third party. 81 There was no documentation indicating that
the one remaining drill was to go to the buyer.s2 Downplaying the role of
identification, 83 the court could see no reason for affording this buyer of
equipment less protection than a Herman-type buyer of fungibles. 84 But
once again, in light of the facts of the case, it would not be wise to conclude
with any degree of certainty that a contract alone is sufficient to protect a
76. See id. at 477, 392 N.E.2d at 345.
77. Id. at 479, 392 N.E.2d at 346. The court continued:
Whether the buyer is a buyer in the ordinary course is not affected by whether there
has been a completed sale or merely the making of the contract to sell, since the fact
that title has not yet been transferred as between the dealer and the purchaser does
not prevmt the latter from being regarded as a buyer in the ordinary course of
business, insofar as the secured creditor of the dealer is concerned, where the
transaction between the dealer and the purchaser is ordinary or typical in the trade.
Id., 392 N.E.~!d at 346 (quoting ANDERSON, UNIFORM CoMMERCIAL CoDE § 1-201:25 (2d ed.
1970)).
78. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH 47 (1930):
Surely this much is certain: the actual dispute before the court is limited as straitly by
the facts as by the form which the procedural issue has assumed. What is not in the
facts cannot be present for decision. Rules which proceed an inch beyowl the facts must be

suspect.
Id. (emphasis added).
79. Comment 5 to§ 2·501 provides in Eertinent part:
Undivided shares in an identified fungible bulk, such as grain in an elevator or oil in
a storage tank, can be sold. The mere malcing of the contract with reference to an
undivided share in an identified fungible bulk is enough under subsection {a) to effect
an identification if there is no explicit agreement otherwise.
U.C.C. § 2-501 comment 5. Thus, the buyer in Herman had a strong argument under§ 2-501
that the fertilfaer was identified to the contract.
80. 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982).
81. Id. at 539-40, 442 N.E.2d at 671.
82. Id. at 5.39, 442 N.E.2d at 671.
83. See id. at 543-44, 442 N.E.2d at 674 ("substantive rights ... sho;lld not tum upon a
concept w elusive and ephemera!.").
84.Id.
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buyer. True, the drill had not been identified to the contract but only a
mere formality was lacking. Clearly, the drill seized by the secured party was
the drill awaiting delivery to the buyer.85 Also potentially important is the
fact of full payment. In the court's own words: "[t]here is no sensible reason
to deviate from Herman, especially where the retail purchaser has fully
performed his obligations of the contract."86
In addition to the foregoing cases, several other cases also have been
interpreted as endorsing a time of contracting test for determining buyer
status.87 But once again, the facts of each make the accuracy of that
conclusion doubtful. In Troy Lumber Co. v. Williams 88 the buyers signed a
"proposal" to purchase a mobile home and made a down payment of
$600. 89 When the seller's president left town with the company's cash, the
buyers, having lost interest in going through with the sale, brought suit to
recover their downpayment. 90 At their behest and pursuant to a writ of
attachment, the sheriff randomly levied upon a mobile home on the seller's
lot, thereby prompting the secured party's intervention.9 1 The court
dismissed the buyers' assertion that their contract gave them priority:
This would be a valid argument if the plantiffs were in fact
buyers, i.e., if they were either attempting to enforce the contract
of sale or defending their right to free possession of the property
after having performed under the contract. However, the plaintiffs have, in effect, rescinded this contract by demanding refund
of their downpayment.92
What the court meant by this statement is anyone's guess. One possibility is
that the court intended only to dismiss the relevance of section 9-307(1),93
and not, as some have assumed, to indicate that the buyers would prevail if
the section were relevant. 94

85. Maybe what the court believed to be "elusive and ephemeral," see supra note 83, and
meant to reject were the technicalities of identification rather than the need somehow to pick
out the goods destined for the buyer. This view would explain and add content to the
conclusion of the opinion that "goods need [not] be identified by number before section 9-307
will protect the retail purchasers." 110 Ill. App. 3d at 546, 442 N.E.2d at 675 (emphasis
added).
86. Id. at 545-46, 442 N.E.2d at 675 (emphasis added).
87. This characterization of the Herman and M & W Gear opinions can be found in Note,
Is the Good Faith Purchaser Always Right?, supra note 58, at 144-46.
88. 124 Ga. App. 636, 185 S.E.2d 580 (1971). In M & W Gear the Illinois court read Truy
as "implicitly reject[ing] any necessity for identification as a prerequisite to relief and
protection under section 9-307." 110 Ill. App. 3d at 545, 442 N.E.2d at 674.
89. 124 Ga. App. at 636, 185 S.E.2d at 581.
90. Id., 185 S.E.2d at 581.
91. Id., 185 S.E.2d at 581.
92. Id. at 637-38, 185 S.E.2d at 582.
93. Because the buyers no longer wished to be buyers, but chose instead to become judicial
lien creditors, U.C.C. § 9-30l(b) would supply the governing priority rule rather than U.C.C.
§ 9-307(1). See 124 Ga. App. at 638, 185 S.E.2d at 582.
94. See, e.g, Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 855 ("[I1he [Truy] court suggested
that the process of buying has progressed sufficiently to support buyer in ordinary course
status when there has merely been partial payment under a contract in unidentified goods.").
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Another opinion defying easy categorization is Chrysler Credit Corp. v.
Sharp.9 5 In Sharp the buyer was a disinterested party but, because the rights
of a third party were involved, 96 her section 9-307(1) qualifications were
nevertheless the center of attention. 97 She had signed an installment sales
contract, which included a security agreement, to purchase a specific
identifiable car and had traded in her old car. Although the court held this
was sufficient to elevate her to the status of a buyer, its reasoning was
muddled. As Professor Skilton points out, it is impossible to say whether the
court found that she was a buyer because it wanted the chattel paper
purchaser to prevail or whether the chattel paper purchaser prevailed
because the court felt she was, in fact, a buyer. 98 The court's language
suggests the former. 99 If the latter reason correctly states the court's
position, however, it must be understood that this is more than a mere
contract to purchase case. There was full or at least partial payment100 and
95. 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525 (Sup. Ct. 1968). In Herman v. First Farmers State
Bank, 73 Ill. App. 3d 475, 392 N.E.2d 344 (1979), the court cited Sharp for the proposition that
a buyer need not receive possession or title to qualify under§ 9-307(1 ). Id. at 478, 392 N .E.2d
at !145-46. Although it is difficult to fault this reading of Sharp, the same cannot be said for the
apparent conclusion in Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobile Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177, 580 P.2d 8,
9 (Ct. App. 1978), that the Sharp court held that one who signs a sales contract and security
agreement, Hithout more, becomes a buyer. The Rex Financial case is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 101-04.
96. For a discussion of "satellite rights," see supra notes 45-54 and accompanying text. The
suit was a conversion action brought by the assignee of the sales contract and security
agreement, i..?., chattel paper, against the seller's secured creditor who had seized and sold the
collateral. 56 Misc. 2d at 262, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 526-27.
97. Although a named defendant, the buyer vanished and was never served. 56 Misc. 2d at
262, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 527. Not all buyers in all satellite cases will, however, be disinterested in
the dispute b·~tween the secured party and the holder of the chattel paper. Even if the buyer's
liability for the purchase price would not be discharged regardless of which party prevails, see
U.C.C. § 9-206(1), quoted infra note 100, the buyer's stake in the litigation is real. If the seller's
secured part) wins, the buyer loses the goods but continues to owe the purchase price. If the
holder of the chattel paper wins, the buyer is still responsible for the unpaid purchase price yet
obtains the benefit of the proceeds received from the subsequent disposition of the goods. See
u.c.c. § 9-504(1).
98. Skilton, supra note 14, at 84. Professor Skilton finds that "[t]his tie-in with the buyer's
status illustrated in Chrysler Credit Corporation v. Sharp is not completely persuasive." Id. He
points to U.C.C. § 9-308 and suggests that its application should control the outcome when, as
here, the chattel paper purchaser is asserting rights as the seller's assignee, not as a retail
financer who received a security interest directly from the buyer. Id. at 84-85. Professor Skilton
would be con-ect if the seller's secured party were basing its claim to the car on its interest in
the chattel paper. But U.C.C. § 9-308 is irrelevant when the asserted interest derives directly
from the seller, secures the seller's obljgations, and when the secured party repossesses the
good. See supra note 49.
99. The court stated:
The court feels a buyer who makes a purchase on a printed form contract in good
faith with a full understanding it is a binding contract, who knowingly signs a retail
installment payment obligation and trades in an old car in addition must, certainly as
to a retail financer furnishing new value on the strength of such contract and as to an
entruster giving the dealer wide latitude of sale goods [sic], be deemed a buyer in the
ordinary course of business, without regard to the technicalities of when title
[par.ses] ....
56 Misc. 2d at 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 534 (emphasis added).
100. Trading in the old car quite obviously constituted partial payment. Indeed, the Code
itself recognh:es that " '[b]uying' may be ... by exchange of other property," see U.C.C. §
1-201(9), and the Sharp court labelled the trade-in "valuable consideration." 56 Misc. 2d at 267,
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the good was clearly identified to the contract.
In contrast to the preceeding cases, Rex Financial Corp. v. Mobile
America Corp.,101 did not involve partial or full payment by the buyers,102 yet
the court found that the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course. 103 Still,
the case does not resolve whether a valid contract alone is enough to protect
the buyer. Although the buyers in Rex Financial did not take possession or
themselves make a payment to the seller, one relevant fact, completely
overlooked by the court, is that title to the good had passed. 104 One can only
guess whether the court would have felt the same if this fact, which
necessarily assumes the identification of the good to the contract, were
absent from the transactional picture.
To summarize, judicial opinions and academic literature recognize
that there are cases standing for the proposition that contract formation
alone is a sufficient prerequisite for buyer statµs. But when each case is
examined, one finds an additional fact or two that makes one suspect that
the court is not giving its true thinking or perhaps that the court has yet to
focus on what its true thinking really is. Because a pure "contract formation
only" case has yet to appear in print, there is simply no way to know
whether any court would sanction an approach that defines buyer status
solely in terms of "a contract to buy."

288 N.Y.S.2d at 531. But see Rex Fin. Corp. v. Mobil Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 178, 580 P.2d
8, 10 (Ct. App. 1978) (no downpayment in Sharp; trade-in merely act of good faith). It should
be noted that although the contract in Sharp recited that, in addition to the trade-in, a cash
downpayment of $443.00 was made, the downpayment was not in fact made. 56 Misc. 2d at
263, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 527. Because the seller agreed to defer the payment until Mrs. Sharp
received an anticipated tax refund, the court did not think that the nonpayment impugned her
good faith. Id. at 267, 288 N.Y.S.2d at 531-32. Although more facts are needed, one could
argue that Sharp is not a part payment case but rather one involving full payment. The seller
received the car's price (except for the $433.00 due from Mrs. Sharp) from the chattel paper
purchaser and Mrs. Sharp quite possibly, lost her defense of failure of consideration. See
U.C.C. § 9-206(1), which provides:
Subject to any statute or decision which establishes a different rule for buyers or
lessees of consumer goods, an agreement by a buyer or lessee that he will not assert
against an assignee any claim or defense which he may have against the seller or
lessor is enforceable by an assignee who takes his assignment for value, in good faith
and without notice of a claim or defense, except as to defenses of a type which may
be asserted against a holder in due course of a negotiable instrument under . . .
[Article 3]. A buyer who as part of one transaction signs both a negotiable instrument
and a security agreement makes such an agreement.
u.c.c. § 9-206-1.
101. 119 Ariz. 176, 580 P.2d 8 (Ct. App. 1978). Rex Financial was, however, another satellite
rights case in which the seller had been paid by the chattel paper purchaser, and the buyers
might have lost their personal defenses. See supra note 100. Nevertheless, the case has been
said to support the view that a buyer is a buyer if there is a valid contract and if the transaction
is typical in the seller's business. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, 859-60.
102.119 Ariz. at 176-77, 580 P.2d at 8-9.
103. Id. at 178, 580 P.2d at 10.
104. The contract provided that title passed when the security agreement was signed. Id. at
176-77, 580 P.2d at 8-9; see U.C.C. § 2-401(1) ("[T]itle to goods passes from the seller to the
buyer in any manner and on any conditions explicitly agreed on by the parties.").
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The Passage of Title Date

A requirement that title pass before buyer status arises lies close on the
spectrum t.o a definition of buyer in ordinary course that is grounded on the
buyer's possession, but more to the center. 10 5 The nonleading case of
Integrity Insurance Co. v. Marine Midland Bank-Western 106 nicely displays the
reasoning underlying this position and how acceptance of the position
often forces the manipulation of doctrine to serve "the ends of justice."
In Integrity Insurance Co. the buyers executed a retail installment
contract for the purchase of a mobile home, made a cash downpayment of
more than $400, 107 and gave the seller a security interest 108 in the home.
Contrary to the contract's recitation that delivery had occurred, the home
remained with the seller pending buyers' acquisition of a site on which to
install it. Not until after a site was found did the buyers learn that the seller's
secured creditor had taken their home.
If the court's rhetoric is believed, then the issue of who had title when
the home was seized was decisive of the outcome. The court based its
holding on a questionable piggy-backing of Code provisions: "To be a
buyer in the ordinary course of business ... [section 1-201(9)], there must
be a sale, which consists in the passing of title from the seller to the buyer
for a price ... [section 2-106(1)] .... "l09 Once the court picked the test, the
105. When the goods are to be shipped to the buyer it would normally be of little
consequence whether a coun selects a passage of title or possession approach. In either
instance, the buyer is probably unprotected until the seller loses possession. See U.C.C. §§
2-401(2) ("[U]nless othenvise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place
at which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of the
goods ..•• "); 2-503(2), (3); 2-504. A passage of title approach would be more favorable to a
buyer than one requiring possession only if, by agreement, the transfer of title precedes the
seller's loss of possession or the delivery of the goods is to occur without the goods being
moved. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3).
106. 90 Mhc. 2d 868, 396 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Sup. Ct. 1977). If frequency of discussion and
citation are nhat make a case a "leading case," then the status of "leading title theory case"
belongs to Chrysler Corp. v. Adamatic, Inc., 59 Wis. 2d 219, 208 N.W.2d 97 (1973). See supra
note 71 and accompanying text. This status, however, may be the result of an erroneous
reading of the opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 61-70. Two otl1er cases that also
may or may not be title theory cases are Thompson v. McMaster (In re Fritz-Mair Mfg. Co.),
16 Bankr. 41;', 419-20 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982) (unclear from opinion whether title must pass
to qualify under§ 9-307(1) or whether title's passage only conditions buyer's right to obtain
possession of good from seller's bankruptcy trustee) and Levine v. Ficke, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
1059, 1060 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1968) (title passed but unclear whether occurrence of passage is
necessary or merely sufficient).
107. Although the contract mentioned a $1400 downpayment the buyers actually paned
with less than that. There was a cash payment of $400 plus an undisclosed amount for the cost
of installing the unit. 90 Misc. 2d at 869, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 320.
108. Althotigh the result of the case hinged on the buyers' status, the opinion does not
illuminate whether they had an interest in the outcome. It was the chattel paper purchaser
who claimed that the buyers were buyers in the ordinary course. See id. at 869-70, 396 N.Y.S.2d
at 320. Unlik<: the opinion in Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 288 N.Y.S.2d
525 (Sup. Ct. 1968), see supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text, there is nothing in Integrity
Insurance Co. that cautions the reader that the coun's analysis rested on the absence of the
buyers as claimants.
109. 90 Misc. 2d at 870, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 320. Those courts explicitly rejecting title as a test
did so, not because they were troubled with the test's definitional source, but because of the
Code's general rejection of title as a means of sorting out respective propeny interests. See, e.g.,
General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 377 (Bankr.
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court was determined to find that title had passed to the buyers. Integrity
Insurance Co., however, fails to articulate why title had passed. Because the
agreement did not specify when title passed, the question of who had title
had to be answered by looking at either section 2-401(2) 110 or section
2-401(3)lll depending upon whether delivery was to involve moving the
home. Unfortunately, the court never specified which subsection applied.
Without explanation, the court cryptically reasoned that the seller's continued possession of the home was in reality constructive possession by the
buyers because there had been constructive delivery by the seller. 112 The
court then cited section 2-308 113 and stated that "delivery took place at the
dealer's place of business, where the contract was executed, payment made
and the certificate of sale ... executed and delivered." 114 Forgotten was the
seller's installation obligation, which another court in another case thought
required the application of section 2-401(2) and the conclusion that title
remained with the seller until the actual installation of the home. 115
Although the Integrity Insurance Co. opinion is a sloppy one, the court had
no apparent doubt about the outcome it wanted and why: "All of [the
buyers'] obligations under the contract had been performed."11 6
A passage of title approach, when applied, is not much different from
the other solutions to the buyer in ordinary course problem. It is less a
satisfying theory of buyer in ordinary course status than it is a vehicle for
legitimating an opinion and achieving a desired result. Regardless of
D. Del. 1985); Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 542, 442 N.E.2d 670, 672 (1982);
Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super.. 257, 266, 487
A.2d 953, 958 (1985). For a discussion of the Code's displacement oftitle location as a relevant
inquiry, see infra text accompanying notes 216-25.
110. Section 2-401(2) provides in part:
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed title passes to the buyer at the time and place at
which the seller completes his performance with reference to the physical delivery of
the goods, despite any reservation of a security interest and even though a document
of title is to be delivered at a different time or place •..•
u.c.c. § 2-401(2).
111. Section 2-401(3) provides:
Unless otherwise explicitly agreed where delivery is to be made without moving the
goods,
(a) if the seller is to deliver a document of title, title passes at the time when and the
place where he delivers such documents; or
(b) if the goods are at the time of contracting already identified and no documents
are to be delivered, title passes at the time and place of contracting.
u.c.c. § 2-401(3).
112. 90 Misc. 2d at 870-71, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321.
113. Section 2-308 makes the seller's place the place for delivery in the absence of an
agreement otherwise. See U.C.C. § 2-308.
114. 90 Misc. 2d at 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321. The court's reference to § 2-308 makes it
appear that§ 2-401(3)(b) was the pertinent passage of title rule, with the result that title passed
at the time and place of contracting. See U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b), quoted supra note 111. If that
were true then there was no reason for the court to indulge in its constructive
delivery/constructive possession discussion and the place where payment was made and the
certificate of sale delivered was irrelevant.
115. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 377
(Bankr. D. Del. 1985).
116. 90 Misc. 2d at 871, 396 N.Y.S.2d at 321. This observation is also superfluous.
Performance by the buyer of its obligations does not determine the location of title.
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whether the result in Integrity Insurance Co. is correct, this sort of malleable
lawmaking process tends to distort doctrine, making its future uncertain
and fore~.hadowing future distortions to accommodate contextual and
factual differences.111

D.

The Identification Date

Beginning with Hol,stein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 11 8 several courts
ostensibly have held that one becomes a buyer the moment the good is
"identified" to the contract of sale. 119 From the buyer's perspective this
solution i~. the next best thing to a time of contracting approach. Identification under section 2-501 occurs when a particular good is in some way
earmarked for a particular buyer. This happens "when the contract is made
if it is for i:he sale of goods already existing and identified" 12o or, if the sale
is of future goods, "when [they] are shipped, marked or othenvise designated by the seller as goods to which the contract refers." 121 To the joy of
the buyer and the chagrin of the secured party, identification will, therefore, frequently pre-date the passage of title and always pre-date the
delivery of the goods to the buyer.122
Courts have offered four principal rationales for making identification
the event that frees the goods from the secured party's lien. First,
identification occurs when the buyer begins to acquire those property sticks
which, when bundled together, will eventually signal what is commonly
117. To appreciate this observation one need only consider the court's effort to distinguish
IntEgrity Insuiance Co. in Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 147-49, 386
N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (1979). The Gaucher coun did so on the suspect basis that § 2-401(2)
applied in Integrity Insurance Co. only because "the purchase price ha[d] been paid and the
seller [was] holding the goods for the convenience of the buyer." Id. at 147, 386 N.E.2d at
1056. On this same point, a recent article suggests that similar concerns had prompted Karl
Llewellyn's push for the special merchant rules of Article 2. According to the author,
"Llewellyn did not like the judicial torture, manipulation and misconstruction of contractual
language or intent to which courts resorted to achieve their desired result. He referred to these
exercises as 'coven tools' of intentional and creative misconstruction.... " Hillinger, The Article
2 Ilferchant Rules: Karl Ilewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in
Commercial u1w, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1169 (1985) (citation omitted).
118. 122 R.I. 211, 404 A.2d 842 (1979).
119. See, e.g., Manin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir.
1979) (dictum); General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr.
370, 378 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc.,
338 Pa. Super. 257, 267, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 463 A.2d
142, 148 (R.I. 1983).
120. U.C.C § 2-50l(l)(a). At least one commentator has shown an appreciation for the
circular nature of this definition. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 867 n.80.
121. u.c.c. § 2-50l(l)(b).
122. The Code's definitional approach to when identification takes place assumes the
nonexistence of an explicit agreement contrary to the Code's definition. The panics remain
free to establish their own rules. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1). The absence of a constraint on
definition is also evidenced by the recognition that an identification, once made, is reversible.
See id. comment 2 ("It is possible, however, for the identification to be tentative or
contingent."): General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gayl (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370,
380 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985) ("[Seller] had the right to substitute the goods under ... §
2-501(2)."). Also, identification does not require that the goods be in a deliverable state. See
U.C.C. § 2-5(•1, comment 4; Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 215, 404
A.2d 842, 844 (1979).
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looked upon as absolute ownership of the goods. 123 Although never clearly
articulated in the cases, these sticks presumably are being acquired without
the taint of outstanding interests that were not meant to survive full
performance of the contract. 124 Second, courts have not been shy about
expressing their pro-buyer orientation. By making priority depend upon
identification of the goods to the contract, courts naturally foster this
one-sided solicitude. 12s Third, some courts have thought that a comparison
of section 9-307 and section 2-403 with their statutory antecedents supports
the view that the Code was intended to improve the buyer's plight. 126
Finally, there is the undeniable fact that the Code de-emphasizes title. 121
Rather than breathe added life into the doctrine by making title the
determinant of buyer status, some courts have relied instead on the concept
of identification.12s
Ignoring for the present the correctness of defining buyer status in
terms of identification, one should note that the cases supporting this view
are not without their flaws. Probably the most powerful general criticism is
that each case lacks a theoretical underpinning. Although courts identify
specific reasons for choosing identification as the buyer's safe harbor, these
reasons provide less support for this particular solution than they do for the
rejection of certain alternative solutions and an end result favorable to the
buyer. Another problem with these cases, and one that makes their categorization suspect, is that they leave the legal and business communities in
the dark concerning the extent to which the buyer's prepayment matters. 129
123. Identification occurs the moment the buyer first acquires "a special property and an
insurable interest in goods ...." U.C.C. § 2-501(1). From these two sticks flow several property
rights. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-502 (right to goods on seller's insolvency); 2-716(3) (right to seek
remedy of replevin); 2-722(a) (right to sue third parties who damage goods).
124. For cases in which this view has surfaced, see Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'!
Bank, 612 F.2d 745, 749 (3d Cir. 1979); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 267, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985). But see Wilson v. M & W
Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 543, 442 N.E.2d 670, 673 (1982) (using comments to § 2-501 to
show relative unimportance of identification and hence its inappropriateness as test for buyer
status).
125. See, e.g., Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211, 217, 404 A.2d 842, 845
(1979) ("The identification approach requires inventory financiers to become better acquainted with the inventory and marketing practices of their borrowers. The risk of loss in
such situations quite properly should be on the lender rather than on the buyer."); see also
supra note 65.
126. See, e.g., Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super.
257, 266-67, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985); Holstein v. Greenwich Yacht Sales, Inc., 122 R.I. 211,
216, 404 A.2d 842, 845 (1979). For a comparison of the present statutes with their
antecedents, see infra notes 161-64 and accompanying text.
127. See infra text accompanying notes 216-25.
128. See, e.g., Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super.
257, 266, 487 A.2d 953, 958 (1985) ("[T]he Code expressly diminishes the importance of title
in ascertaining rights in property ....").
129. With the exception of Martin Marietta Corp. v. New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 612 F.2d 745
(3d. Cir. 1979), which is silent regarding payment, each identification case involves a seller
who, because of the buyer's payment in cash, paper, or property, has received a portion of or
all of the purchase price. See General Elec. Credit Corp. v. Gay! (In re Darling's Homes, Inc.),
46 Bankr. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Del. 1985); Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer
Garage, Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 261, 487 A.2d 953, 955 (1985); Serra v. Ford Motor Credit
Co., 463 A.2d 142, 143 (R.I. 1985).
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Several cases hint that it matters a good dea1.rno

IV.

WEAKNESSES IN THE CONVENTIONAL DEFINITIONS

As discussed above, the issue of when buyer status attaches has
received frequent attention from the courts.l31 Not surprisingly, this
attention has resulted in the expression of four divergent views on the
issue, 132 a situation that, although unfortunate in itself, is made more
troubling by the absence of any attempt to develop a conceptual framework
or to articulate a valid policy ground upon which to justify the selection of
a particular approach. The next two sections demonstrate that all four
solutions must be rejected. 133 Each solution is unacceptable for reasons
peculiar to it and for one reason common to all.
A.

The Contract Date

Of the four solutions, the one easiest to reject is that which would
define buyer status in terms of the contract's formation. 134 Quite clearly one
cannot be a buyer absent a contract. Yet a condition necessary to buyer
status need not be a sufficient condition. Something more than a contract
is needed. Just what more is needed is left for later discussion.13s
A natural starting point for analyzing the contract formation theory,
and one t~~at seemingly lends itself to a time of contracting approach is the
Code's definition of "buyer." Section 2-103(1)(a), in not atypical circular
fashion, informs us that "a person who buys or contracts to buy goods" 136 is
a buyer. Thus, the Code apparently recognizes that buyer status attaches
130. Consider, for example, the following expression of sensitivity to the buyer's predicament in Big Knob Volunteer Fire Co. v. Lowe & Moyer Garage Inc., 338 Pa. Super. 257, 487
A.2d 953 (1985):
The Volunteer Fire Department is a non-profit organization, the revenues of which
are derived mainly from functions to raise money and direct solicitation of donations.
After choosing the lowest bidder to supply the fire truck, the Department paid
$48,000, in advance, on the total purchase price of some $51,000. This prepayment
remlted under the contract in a 5 percent discount on the price. This evidence may
indicate limited resources and an attempt to make the best use of those resources by
reducin;;- the total outlay for the fire truck.
Id. at 271-72, 487 A.2d at 961 (citations omitted). See also General Ele.:. Credit Corp. v. Gayl
(111 re Darling's Homes, Inc.), 46 Bankr. 370, 378 (Bankr. D. Del. 19:35) in which the court
approved of subjecting the inventory financer "to the risk that a security interest in a dealer's
imentory will be defeated by these who have made payments on account and don't receive their
goods." Id. (emphasis added).
131. See s1;pra text accompanying notes 55-130.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 56-71 (possession date), 72-104 (contract date),
10.3-17 (passage of title date) & 118-30 (identification date).
133. See i71fra te:u accompanying notes 134-262.
134. The ~.uthor of a student Note would take grave exception with the statement in the text.
The Note argues that an enforceable contract is all that is needed to cut off a valid security
interest. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 878. Concerned, however, with the
problems the seller's continued possession might cause the secured party following the seller's
default, the Note's author would condition the buyer's priority on the existence of records,
markings, or labelings which would inform the secured party that the goods have been sold.
Id. at 876-7~1.
135. See infra text accompanying notes 242-62.
136. U.C.C. § 2-103(l)(a) (emphasis added).
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concurrently with contract formation. 13 ' Apart from theoretical difficulties,
serious interpretive problems arise when assigning to this Code section the
role of authoritative source for a temporal definition of buyer status.
Article I, for example, defines the term central to the inquiry: buyer
in ordinary course. 138 Several Code articles employ this term. 139 Section
2-103(1)(a), on the other hand, is an Article 2 definition of buyer that
except by analogy applies only to Article 2. 140 Absent a legitimate justification for doing so, one should not muster section 2-103(1)(a) into Article
1. 141 Indeed, if the definitional ambiguity of buyer in ordinary course is to
be clarified by drawing upon Article 2 definitions, the definition of "sale" in
section 2-106(1)142 is the far more logical candidate for the job. This
conclusion is reinforced by the fact that both courts and commentators have
succumbed to this temptation.143
To say that no compelling definitional basis exists for making the
moment of contracting the critical event is not to say that such an approach
is erroneous. In assessing the utility of a time of contracting definition, turn
again to the position taken by one Illinois appellate court that "the focus in
a case such as this should be on the 'ordinary course of business' requirement of section 9-307." 144 In short, this court seemed to require for the
buyer's protection no more than a typical contract in an ordinary business
transaction. The assumption underlying this position is that it best effectuates the legitimate expectations of the buyer. 145
Given this assumption, it is reasonable to ask just what are the buyer's
137. Moreover, U.C.C. § 2-106(1) defines "present sale" as a "sale which is accomplished by
the making of the contract." One should, however, be cautious of overemphasizing this
definition. Because a "sale" takes place when title passes from the seller to the buyer, id., and
because title can pass at the time of contracting, see U.C.C. § 2-401(3)(b), the definition may
simply mean that a present sale requires the concurrence of two events-formation of a
contract and passage of title.
138. See supra text accompanying note 19.
139. See supra notes 13, 24.
140. Indeed, by use of the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires," the preamble to
U.C.C. § 2-103(1) invites, on occasion, disregard of that section's definitions even if the
problem at hand is solely within the confines of Article 2.
141. For a similar thought, see Jackson & Peters, Qp.estf()T Uncertainty: A Proposalf()T Flexible
Resolution of Inherent Conflicts Between Article 2 and Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 87
YALE LJ. 907, 952 n.162 ("It is not an easy jump, however, to conclude that the definition of
the term 'buyer' should influence the definition of the separate term 'buyer in ordinary
course.' "). In this case, a general reluctance to indulge in the transportation of definitions
from one article to another is reinforced by the fact that the term "contracts to buy" is absent
from the definition in § 1-201(9) of buyer in ordinary course; the section refers only to a
person who buys. This point was noted by the New York Law Revision Commission, 1 N.Y.L.
REVISION COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 231 (1955), and in Note, BuyerSecured Parry Conflict, supra note 55, at 675.
142. The word "sale" does appear in U.C.C. § 1-201(9). Because a sale presupposes a
transfer of title, merely contracting to buy will not necessarily result in a sale.
143. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text; see also infra note 209.
144. Herman v. First Farmers State Bank, 73 Ill. App.3d 475, 479, 392 N.E.2d 344, 346
(1979). For a discussion of Herman, see supra text accompanying notes 75-79.
145. See Note, A Test and a Proposal, supra note 55, at 860 ("The determination of buyer in
ordinary course status upon the initial contract formation date respects the legitimate
transactional interest that the buyer has acquired in the goods, whether or not identified to the
contract.'').
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expectations. Since the buyer can expect no more than the seller's performance of its contractual obligations, one should consider, for a moment,
these obligations. The seller's basic obligation is to tender conforming
goods when and where the contract requires that they be tendered. 146
Moreover. the buyer has every reason to believe that this expectation will
remain unimpaired pending the agreed upon time for performance. 147 To
preserve these twin expectations, it is hardly necessary to confer buyer
status at the time of contract formation regardless of the contract's
typicality. This would be out of step with other Code provisions and would
give the security of purchase ideal a bit too much security.
Aside from the need for the goods to conform to the warranties of
quality that have become part of the contract, 148 one should note that the
drafters of the Code also made sure that, unless expressly excluded, every
contract will carry with it a basic title warranty that title, when conveyed, will
be good and that the goods, when delivered, will be free from any security
interest. 14'l This Code provision is intended to mirror what is presumably
every buyer's basic title expectation: When the deal is done and the goods
are in hand, the goods are free from unbargained-for claims and encumbrances.1M While it does not follow from this that·buyer status must await
delivery, the provision does detract from the persuasiveness of an expectation justification for a contract date definition. 1s1
Maintenance of the Code's structural harmony suggests further rea146. U.C.C:. § 2-301 ("The obligation of the seller is to transfer and deliver ... in accordance
with the contract.").
147. U.C.C:. § 2-609(1) ("A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the
other's expectation of receiving due performance will not be impaired."). If this expectation is
impaired, § 2-609(1) gives the aggrieved party the right to demand adequate assurance of
future performance and, until assurances are received, to suspend performance of the
contract. Id. See generally Leary & Frisch, Is Revision Due for Article 2?, 31 VILL. L. REv. 399, 463,
463 & nn. 2B7-38 (1986).
148. The.Code contains several -sections which bear upon the e}:istence and scope of
warranties of quality. See U.C.C. §§ 2-313 (creation of express warranties); 2-314 (creation of
implied wammty of merchantability); 2-315 (creation of implied warranty of fitness for
particular pt1rpose); 2-316 (exclusion or modification of warranties); 2-317 (cumulation and
conflict of warranties); 2-318 (third party beneficiaries of warranties).
149. U.C.C:. § 2-312(1). This warranty is not designated as one of the Code's implied
warranties. The reason, we are told, is to prevent its exclusion by a general disclaimer of
implied wammties under§ 2-316(3). U.C.C. § 2-312 comment 6. If the warranty is to be
excluded by contract the exclusion must be by specific language. U.C.C. § 2-312(2).
150. As Prnfessor Nordstrom observed:
The Code does not contain a seller's warranty that the goods are free from a security
interest while they are in the possession of the seller-only that the goods are delivered
free from a security interest. Thus, if there are some security interests which are
terminated in the goods at the time of the delivery, there would be no default in the
warranty of title even though the goods were subject to a security interest while they
were held by the seller.
R. NORDSTRO'.I, LAW OF SALES 187-88 (1970).
151. If the buyer has reasonable grounds to doubt the seller's future ability to deliver good
title, the Code sufficiently protects the buyer's expectation by giving the buyer the right to
demand adequate assurances from the seller and, in the interim, to suspend its own
performance. See U.C.C. § 2-609; see also Clem Perrin Marine Towing v. Panama Canal Co.,
730 F.2d 181i, 190-91 (5th Cir. 1984) (doubt as to seller's future ability to deliver good title
justifies dem.md for adequate assurance and, if not forthcoming, suspension of performance
is justified).
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sons for refusing to accord buyer status at time of contracting. 152 First, the
Code explicitly states that "[g]oods must be both existing and identified
before any interest in them can pass." 153 Thus, to say that one becomes a
buyer prior to this time means that certain outstanding interests in
unidentified goods can be terminated in favor of one who lacks an interest
in particular goods. It is incentive enough to demand more than just a
contract in order t0 avoid this sort of nonsensical doctrine. 15'1
Second, time of contracting as a definition would, in some cases, foster
a degree of discord between the creation of an interest under the Code and
the severance of that interest. Suppose, for example, that the buyer wishes
to finance a purchase through a third party lender who intends to secure its
advance by taking a security interest in the purchased item. Before the
security interest can attach, the buyer must acquire "rights in the collateral."155 Although the meaning of this phrase is notably obscure, 156 the
phrase clearly contemplates that the buyer must have some interest in the
collateral. 157 It would be paradoxical to find a sufficient quantum of rights
in the collateral for purposes of attachment, yet, at the same time, find that
the buyer has no interest in the collateral under Article 2. 158 Having
concluded that the buyer must, at the very least, have an interest in the
goods before the lender's security interest can attach, one queries whether
it is theoretically sound to conclude in turn that the buyer, without an
interest, can successfully cause the elimination of certain third party
interests in the goods. More to the point, a period of time would exist
during which the buyer's priority is not shared by the lender. This result
would be strikingly at odds with the Code's basic conveyancing principle
that a transferee receives no less than what the transferor had and intended
152. As I argued earlier:
[T]he Code is not an ad hoc collection of commercial statutes, each operating within
its own sphere of influence, but is rather a system of interlocking parts woven
together by strands of common policy concerns. It is, therefore, highly desirable that
a construction of [one] section . . . should be congruent with perceived policy
determinations evidenced by other Code sections.
Frisch, U.C.C. Section 9-315: A Historical and Modem Perspective, 70 MINN. L. REv. l, 42 (1985).
153. U.C.C. § 2-105(2). In this respect article 2 is consistent with its statutory precursor, the
Uniform Sales Act. The latter provided that "no property passes until the goods are
ascertained." UNIFORM SALES Acr- § 17, 1 U.L.A. 309 (1950) (act withdrawn 1962).
154. If the problem of ostensible ownership arising from the seller's continued possession,
see infra text accompanying notes 171-207, were a concern, the absence of identifiable goods
earmarked for future delivery to the buyer would certainly exacerbate the problem. See
generally Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App.3d 538, 442 N.E.2d 670 (1982) (Heiple, J.,
dissenting) (secured party on repossession would have no way of ascertaining existence of
claims to particular item).
155. U.C.C. § 9-203(l)(c).
156. Although U.C.C. § 1-201(36) states that "rights" include remedies, the Code is silent on
the meaning of the phrase "rights in the collateral." The drafters were of the opinion that its
meaning should be left for the courts to work out on a case-by-case basis. See U.C.C. § 9-204
app. I (Reasons for 1972 Change).
157. See, e.g., Mother Lode Bank v. GMAC, 46 Cal. App. 3d 807, 814, 120 Cal. Rptr. 429,
433 (1975) (seller's possession of collateral does not give seller rights); Manger v. Davis, 619
P.2d 687, 680 (Utah 1980) (same).
158. At least one commentator has noted "the anomaly inherent in extending rights to
buyers under Article 9 in goods in which they have no rights under Article 2." Smith, U.C.C.
Survey: Secured Transactions, 39 Bus. LAw. 1395, 1417-18 (1984).
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to convey. 159 At a minimum, a secured party should succeed to whatever
priority rig;hts are enjoyed by its debtor. But if the buyer has yet to obtain
an Article !? interest in the collateral, this logical result is possible only at the
expense of logical reasoning.160
The only justification which surfaces for making buyer status coincident at all times with the contract date is that this definition affords
maximum protection to the buyer. But affording maximum protection
without a reason is no justification. Needless to say, such a solution is
unsatisfactory when, as here, it is decidedly out of step with other Code
provisions.

B.

The Possession Date

If one rejects a contract formation definition of buyer status because it
is prematurely solicitous of the buyer's interests, perhaps the other extreme-extending protection only when the seller has delivered possession-is acceptable. Although historical support exists for this position, the
support cuts both ways and thus serves as argumentative fodder for both
proponent> and opponents of a possession rule.
Comment 9 to section 1-201(9) indicates that the present definition of
buyer in ordinary course is predicated upon Section 1 of the Uniform Trust
Receipts Act's definition of "buyer in ordinary course of trade," which
explicitly required a delivery . 161 Delivery as a watershed event evidently was
also an attractive idea to at least some of the drafters of the Code. The Code
initially made delivery a part of buying in ordinary course. Before the
definition was moved to Article 1, section 2-403(4) of the Code's 1950 draft
defined buyer in ordinary course as one "to whom goods are shipped
pursuant to a pre-existing contract or one to whom they are delivered on
credit." 162
This earlier version of the Code suggests that the drafters intended to
omit a delivery requirement from section 1-201(9). But did they omit that
159. This is no more than a corollary of the derivation principle, see supra note 4 and
accompanyinH text, and has been variously referred to as the "shelter" or "umbrella" principle.
See Dolan, sut>ra note 6, at 812-13. For example, Article 2's shelter principle is embodied in
U.C.C. § 2-40:1(1) which begins with the statement that "[a] purchaser of goods acquires all title
whkh his trar!sferor had ...."
1130. It has been assumed without question that the foundation for Article 9 "rights" is an
Article 2 "interest." See, e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 51, § 2.4, at 2-14 ("To a large extent, the
secured creditor must turn to U.C.C. Article 2 to measure the debtor's 'rights' to goods used
as C•Jllateral."); Smith, supra note 158; u1e also infra notes 201-06 and accompanying text.
11>1. The Uniform Trust Receipts Act codified the pre-Code personal property security
device commonly referred to as the "trust receipt." Trust receipt financing was used primarily
to finance a dealer·s acquisition of inventory and like the Code, the Act recognized the need
for certain buyers to take free of the lender's lien. Section 9-2 of the act gave this protection
to a buyer in the ordinary course of trade which meant "a person to whom goods are sold and
delit•sred for r,ew value and who acts in good faith and without actual knowledge of any
limitation on the trustee's liberty of sale ...." UNIF. TRUST RECEIPTS Acr § 1, 9C U.L.A. 231
(1%7) (emphasis added). Also worthy of attention is§ 25 of the Uniform Sales Act, a direct
antecedent of U.C.C. § 2-403(2). Unlike § 2-403(2), however, § 25 did make delivery to the
buy1:r an explicit predicate for protection. For the full text of§ 25, see supra note 11.
Hi2. U.C.C. § 2-403(4) (Proposed Final Draft 1950). The drafters gave no reason for their
sub~equcnt re:lrafting of the definition.
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requirement because they intended to change prior law 163 or because they
thought the obvious needed no explicit recognition? 164 Notwithstanding
assertions to the contrary the former conclusion rests on firmer ground.
Significantly, a number of Code sections specifically depend for their
operation on a buyer who takes delivery. 165 If delivery is an integral part of
buying why then the coupling of terms in these sections? Since it is doubtful
that the drafters sought to be redundant, a reasonable assumption is that
they never intended buying to depend upon a delivery or change of
possession.166
Another issue concerning the drafters' intent is that an explanation is
needed for the perplexing reference in section 1-201(9) to "receiving goods
or documents of title under a pre-existing contract for sale ...." This
language possibly means that the buyer must receive delivery of the goods
or at least receive delivery in those situations involving a "pre-existing
contract for sale." 167 This reading is troubling, however, because it ignores
both the language and the substance of the remainder of the sentence,
which provides that buying "does not include a transfer in bulk or as
security for or in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt." 168 This last
clause of the definition has a two-fold purpose: to set forth what buying
does include and what it does not include. Because the concept includes the
"receiving goods" situation, the clear implication is that other situationssome not involving receipt-are also included. But if that is true, then why
specify only one situation for statutory reference? The answer may lie in
that same sentence's exclusion of transfers "in total or partial satisfaction of
a money debt." Perhaps, out of an abundance of caution, the drafters had
hoped to make clear that the future delivery of goods pursuant to both a
prior-in-time contract and payment by the buyer is not within the scope of
the exclusion. 169 Viewed in this light, the provision means only that the
163. For the view that the change manifested the belief that buyer protection need not await
delivery, see 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITI' INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPER1Y § 26.6, at 696 (1965);
Warren, supra note 6, at 473 n.23; 1 N.Y.L. REVISION CoMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CODE 232 (1955).
164. Those who believe that the history of the Code does not suggest a deliberate
modification of prior law include Smith, Title and the Right to Possession Under the Unifonn
Commercial Code, 10 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 39, 61 (1968); Note, Is the Good Faith Purchaser
Always Right?, supra note 58, at 137. Justice Robert Braucher had the vague recollection that
the drafters, led by Karl Llewellyn, thought it clear that buying includes delivery and that on
this point the text was explicit enough. See Letter from Robert Braucher to Homer Kripke
Uan. 15, 1978) (reproduced in pan in D. BAIRD & T. JACKSON, supra note 4, at 767).
165. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 7-205, 7-504(2)(b), 9-30l(l)(c).
166. This same thought has been expressed by others. See, e.g., Dolan, The Unifonn
Commercial Code and the Concept of Possession in the Marketing and Financing of Goods, 56 TEX. L.
REv. 1147, 1188 (1978); Jackson & Peters, supra note 141, at 950; Leary & Sperling, supra note
22, at 80-81.
167.Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 23, 24 n.96 ("the 'receiving goods' language
might suggest that delivery is required in the special situation involving a 'pre-existing contract
for sale.' ").
168. u.c.c. § 1-201(9).
169. Commenting on the "receiving goods" language, the New York Law Revision Commission had this to say:
The theory seems to be that where there is a previously made bilateral contract for the
purchase, the buyer's obligation, while it is given in exchange for the seller's promise
to sells [sic] and deliver, and not for the goods, [or] documents ... becomes referable
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reason for the exclusion in section 1-201(9) does not pertain when the
goods transferred and the obligation satisfied are transactionally inseparable.110
Despite the fact that nothing in the relevant Code sections or their
history compels the choice of a possession-based definition, some commentators argue strenuously for its acceptance. 171 The policy-based talisman for
their position is the now venerable doctrine of ostensible or, as it is
sometimes called, reputed ownership. This doctrine, with its genesis in the
celebrated Twyne's Case, 172 is premised on the simple idea that third parties
rely on a person's possession of property as a signal of ownership. 173
Because courts have sought to maintain the accuracy of this signal, they
have viewed as fraudulent any separation of ownership and possession,
to the la~ter within the policy of the value requirement for good faith purchasers
without notice when the goods, [or] documents .•. are delivered.
11'1.Y.L. REvis10N Co~!M'N Sroov OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CooE 235 (1955).
170. Becau:ie of their nature, the three transactions excluded by the last sentence of §
1-201(9) have in common the potential for an inequality of value flow. That is, what the seller
receives i5 lik·~Iy to be worth considerably Jess than what is sold. See Leary & Sperling, supra
note 22, at 65 ("[11ransactions entered into under economic pressure, as in the case of sales in
bull, to one who buys in bulk regularly by one who does not customarily so sell, or exchange
of goods for release of debt, or the giving of security for money borrowed, usually go at a
reduced price."). This risk is not usually present when the components of the exchange are
simultaneously agreed upon.
171. See, e.g., Baird &Jack.son, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of Article
9, 35 STAN. L, REv. 175, 210-12 (1983); Note, ls The Good Faith Purclw,ser Always Right?, supra
note 58, at 153-57.
A related but conceptually distinct question is whether § 9-307(1) should protect a buyer
when the seller's secured party retains possession. The seminal case, Tanbro Fabrics Corp. v.
Deering Milliken, Inc., 39 N.Y.2d 632, 350 N.E.2d 590, 385 N.Y.S.2d 260 (1976), held that it
does. Id. at m:6-37, 350 N.E.2d at 592-93, 385 N.Y.S.2d at 262. For a rnmpling of academic
viev,s on this question, see Birnbaum, Section 9-307(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code Versus
Possessor:i Security Interests-A Reply to Professor Homer Kripke, 33 Bus. LAw. 2607, 2609 (1978)
(section 9-307'(1) should protect buyer regardless of possessor's identity); Dolan, supra note
166, at 1189 (;ecured party in possession should always prevail); Gottlieb, Section 9-307(1) and
Tanhro Fabrics: A Further Response, 33 Bus. LAw. 2611 (1978) (§ 9-307(1) should protect buyer
when secured party has possession); Kreindler, The Uniform Commercial Code and Priority Rights
Between the Sel!erin Possession and a Good Faith Third-Party Purchaser, 82 COM. LJ. 86, 89 (1977)
(secured partf in possession should always prevail); Kripke, Should Section 9-307(1) of the.
Uniform Commercial Code Apply Against a Secured Party in Possession?, 33 Bus. LAw. 153, 156
(1977) (secun·d party in possession should always prevail). The important point is that the
arguments su.Jporting the Tanbro holding do not by their own force pertain to the need for
change of possession in all cases. To say that a secured party in possession is super-perfected,
and hence § 9-307(1) is inapplicable, is not to say that buying requires Fossession when §
9-307(1) is applicable.
172. 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601). In Twyne's Case, the court applied the then
recently enact:!d Statute of Elizabeth, 13 Eliz. 13 c.5 (1570), to a transfer of goods by a debtor
named Pierce to a a·editor named Twyne to satisfy a preexisting debt. 76 Eng. Rep. at 810-11.
Because the goods never left the possession or control of Pierce and the transfer was,
therefore, secret, the court held that the transaction was void as to Pierce's other creditors and
that the transfer justified a criminal action for fraud against the transferee Twyne. Id. at
813-14. From this case comes the often stated principle of common law that a seller's
continued possession of sold goods is fraudulent and that the sale is invalid as to creditors and
purchasers. See, e.g., Ryall v. Rowles, 27 Eng. Rep. 1074, 1081 (1749-50); Sturtevant & Keep
v. Ballard, 9 Johns. 336, 339-40 (N.Y. 1811).
173. See, e.g., Martin v. Mathiot, 14 Serg. & Rawle 214, 216 (Pa. 1826) ("It is a rule of general
policy, which declares possession to be the evidence of property, and the presumption is, that
every man is trusted according to the property in his possession.").
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with the result that the ostensible or apparent owner of the property has
been treated as the true and exclusive owner.1 74
It is not difficult to see how the issue of when one qualifies as a buyer
contains within it the seed of deceptive appearances. Whatever interest is
received by the buyer prior to a change of possession will, lacking notoriety,
be ascertainable only from the seller and occasio~ally from business records
within the seller's control. Because the seller cannot be trusted to disclose
this information to affected third parties, 175 the concern is that the stage is
now set not only for deliberate deception but also for the innocent
misleading of those foolish enough not to solicit this information from an
honest seller. 176 Referring in particular to section 9-307(1), commentators
have argued that those secured parties who conduct spot inspections of
their debtor's inventory should be able to rely on the presence of an item
within that inventory as an assurance that the lien still exists and that the
original priority of the lien continues.177
The validity of the view that our legal system should continue to give
primacy to possession, and its natural corollary that buyers must take
possession to enjoy the Code's protection, can be tested on two quite
different levels: the empirical and the doctrinal. The empirical correctness
of the view depends, in large measure, on whether the underlying
presumption of reliance on possession, which is at the core of Twyne's Case
and the doctrine of ostensible ownership, is in touch with the realities of
modern day commercial life. There is evidence that it is not. 178 Powerful
empirical observation supports the conclusion that factors such as financial
statements, earnings history, commercial credit reports, and credit interchange bureau reports, rather than the possession of specific goods, are the
subject of scrutiny and source of reliance when decisions are made whether
to extend credit or make a loan. 179 •11Jso, it is unlikely the creditor's behavior

174. One source of conflict that surfaced among American jurisdictions was vihether the
seller's possession foreclosed inquiry into the reason for that possession. According to some
courts, the presumption of fraud was irrebuttable, see, e.g., Southern Cal. Collection Co. v.
Napkie, 106 Cal. App. 2d 565, 569, 235 P.2d 434, 437 (1951); Enterprise Wall Paper Co. v.
Rantoul Co., 260 Pa. 540, 543, 103 A. 923, 924 (1918), whereas others considered the
presumption rebuttable, see, e.g., Wooley v. Crescent Auto. Co., 83 N .J .L. 244, 246, 83 A. 876,
877 (1912). For further discussion of this and other aspects of the ostensible ownership
doctrine, see l GLENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREFERENCES§§ 344-363 (rev. ed. 1940).
175. This cynicism is perhaps unfonunate but, no doubt, often justified. See Baird &
Jackson, supra note 171, at 179 ("[B]ecause of the possibility of debtor misbehavior, it is
undesirable to rely on the debtor for information about claims to his own assets.").
176. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 817 ("The doctrine originated to counteract deliberate
deception of creditors but has been extended to situations where specific fraudulent intent is
absent").
177. See, e.g., Baird and Jackson, supra note 171, at 210-12.
178. In recent years, scholars have frequently criticized the doctrine of ostensible ownership
as being out-of-date. See, e.g., l G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERlY § 15.1,
at 463-64 (1965); Gordon, supra note 40, at 576-81; Helman, Ostensible Oumership and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 83 COM. LJ. 25, 32 (1978); Phillips, Flawed Perfection: From Possession
to Filing Under Article 9 (pt. I), 59 B.U.L. REv. 1, 35-41 (1979); Note, The Uniform Commercial
Code and an Insolvent Seller's Possession of Goods Sold, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 91, 91-93 (1955).
179. Summarizing what is thought to be prevailing business practices, Professor Gordon's
comments are typical of those authors who insist that legal rules premised on the importance
of possession are inconsistent with what people actually do. He insists that today's creditor
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will change merely because the transaction involves the acquisition of a
security interest. 180 Whatever information is needed with respect to the
debtor's assets will come, in most cases, from what is written and not from
what is seen during an on-site examination of the debtor's premises. 181
It is also unlikely that creditors, following the initial extension of
credit, will be heavily influenced by possessory evidence of ownership when
they make decisions to advance additional credit or to press for payment. 182
Even if the creditor were to visit the debtor's place of business, the
information the creditor would gain from "looking around" would be a far
cry from the accurate information needed to evaluate the debtor's current
state of financial health.183 Moreover, if the creditor is concerned with
inventory--what a buyer in the ordinary course buys-its ephemeral
presence will exacerbate the unreliability of whatever the creditor supposedly learnc:d from the debtor's possession. 184
While, as a matter of general business practices, there seems to be little
need for an absolute requirement that a buyer "cure" the ostensible
ownership problem (there is no real problem) before being able to assert
priority over other parties, there are strong doctrinal reasons for rejecting
seldom C.lunts or inspects the property in the debtor's possession before he gives
credit. Credit is usually given on the strength of the debtor's financial statements,
particularly his profit and Joss statement (indicating the debtor's potential to pay the
debt from earnings). The creditor also looks at the current ratio and net asset position
as shown on the balance sheet to satisfy himself that assets will be available to meet his
claims if the seller suffers reverses. In addition, a creditor relies on information from
other creditors and from credit agencies as to how the debtor meets his obligations.
Gordon, supra note 40, at 577-78.
180. There is even the real possibility that the perceived value of a security interest to a
creditor lies not in the right to liquidate specific collateral upon default but in the security
interest's tendency to prompt voluntary repayment and make the acquisition of further debt
more difficult. See N. JACOBY & R. SAULNIER, TERM LENDING To Bus1NESS 80-81 (1942).
131. Although the case against the doctrine of ostensible ovmership "seems incontrovertible-business people look to written, not possessory evidence of ownership," Phillips, supra
note 178, at 35, the discussion in the text has ignored the argument that even if creditors do
not themselves check the debtor's possessions, they often rely on auditors who do check. See
Baird & Jackson, supra note 171, at 184 n.32. Addressing this contention, Professor Phillips
argues convincingly that available evidence shows that the vast majority of creditors rely on
unaudited fin1mcial statements that are not normally based on a physical inventory. As a result,
whatever a visit to the debtor's plant discloses to the creditor or any third party will inevitably
deviate from what a fonnal audit of inventory, equipment, and commercial paper would
indicate. See Phillips, supra note 178, at 37-38. Admittedly there will be cases in which a
creditor does rely on possession of specific property. But legal rules should assume the
common, not ::he exceptional, case. For this reason, "law premised on a l:ehavioral model that
assumes reliance upon the debtor's possession of certain assets would mislead that greater
number of cr<'ditors who do not observe and then tally the debtor's possession.'' Id. at 37.
182. What matters to creditors are external indicators of fmancial distress. These indicators
include the cr.~ation of security interests, the filing of lawsuits against the debtor, and a drop
in credit ratin:~· See Gordon, supra note 40, at 578 n.55; Note, supra note 178, at 92.
183. See supra note 181.
184. Referring to an inventory secured party, Professor Dolan has articulated the inherent
unreliability of even a formal inventory count:
The holder of a security interest in inventory cannot long rely on a debtor's
possession because the debtor may soon sell the collateral or have sold it already.
Reliance on a debtor's possession of inventory is always precarious. An inventory
.:heck on Monday will not protect against sales on Tuesday ....
Dolan, supra note 166, at 1158-59.
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possession as the sine qua non of buying. First, the Code's drafters were
aware of and did respond to Twyne's Case and its common law and statutory
progeny. 185 The seller's possession of sold goods is the subject of section
2-402(2). 186 This section takes an approach that can almost be described as
a nonapproach. The section's basic design is to preserve for non-Code law
the resolution of the rights of the seller's creditors in sold but retained
goods. 187 By employing existing law as the starting point, the Code leaves
intact, in each jurisdiction, the "Twyne rule" in whatever form it exists at
present. The section does not, however, incorporate law external to the
Code in one situation: creditors have no right to void as fraudulent the
"retention of possession in good faith and current course of trade by a
merchant-seller for a commercially reasonable time after a sale or identification."188
Section 2-402(2) implicitly recognizes that rights in the goods, superior
to those obtainable by the seller's creditors, begin to flow to the buyer prior
to delivery.189 If this were otherwise, there would be no need to give explicit
approval of the use of a state's Twyne rule to upset the sale. Also, the
exception would not make sense. Why bother to have a rule that it is not
fraudulent under certain circumstances to leave goods with the seller unless
an interest has already been obtained that will have priority over the later
claims of the seller's creditors? 190
Moreover, the Code's definition of "creditor" encompasses a secured
creditor. 19 1 Although section 2-402(3)(a) states that the section was not
meant to impair the rights of secured creditors under Article 9, it does not
preclude the expansion of those rights. 192 As Professors Jackson and
Kronman cogently argue, this might be the case if one accepts that section

185. In addition to the impact of Twyne's Case on the common law, the vast majority of states
enacted statutes that, to varying degrees, responded to the perceived evils engendered by the
seller's continued possession of goods sold. See generally 2 S. WILLISTON, SALES§§ 349-404 (rev.
ed. 1948).
186. Section 2-402(1) will be the subject of later discussion. See infra note 261.
187. Subsection (2) of§ 2-402 provides:
A creditor of the seller may treat a sale or an identification of goods to a contract for
sale as void if as against him a retention of possession by the seller is fraudulent under
any rule of law of the state where the goods are situated, except that retention of
possession in good faith and current course of trade by a merchant-seller for a
commercially reasonable time after a sale ... is not fraudulent.
u.c.c. § 2-402(2).
188.Id.
189. What is implicit in § 2-402(2) is explicit in § 2-402(1). Subsection (1) quite clearly
subordinates the rights of some creditors of the seller to certain remedial rights of certain
buyers. See infra note 261.
190. Professor Dolan takes this analysis a step further. He argues that because of§ 2-402(2)
"creditors must assume that merchantsellers-the sellers to whom section 9-307(1), the Article
9 buyer in ordinary course rule applies-may retain possession of sold goods for a commercially reasonable time." Dolan, supra note 166, at 1156. Hence, the subsection gives fair
warning to creditors that reliance on the seller's possession of goods is, at best, risky business.
191. See U.C.C. § 1-201(12) (" 'Creditor' includes ... a secured creditor ....").
192. U.C.C. § 2-402(3)(a) provides: "Nothing in this Article shall be deemed to impair the
rights of creditors of the seller (a) under the provisions of the Article on Secured Transactions
(Article 9) ...."
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9-!307(1) and section 2-402 depend upon one another.1 93 What one
witnesses is the less than novel phenomenon that a priority previously
obtained can be lost. 19 4 The buyer is, at first, given priority under section
9-lW7(1). But the goods remain with the seller, and the possibility exists that
someone, including the secured party, will be misled by the seller's
possession. At this point in the transaction, and not before, the doctrine of
ostensible ownership plays its part. 195 If the "except'' clause in section
2-402(2) does not apply and if the seller's possession is fraudulent under
applicable state law then the buyer's priority under section 9-307(1) will be
lost and the secured party will once again enjoy its original priority. 196 The
point is not that recognition of the buyer's secret interest does not involve
a certain amount of risk for uninformed third parties. Rather, the argument is that whatever risks do exist are easily minimized; indeed, the risks
seem to be ones that the drafters in other situations thought acceptable.
Artick: 9, for example, which does much to reduce the uncertainty of
property interests, leaves secret interests intact and enforceable in a variety
of cases. 197 Admittedly, most of these cases result from what the drafters no

193. Of the opinion that buyer status occurs when title passes, Jackson and Kronman note
the absurdity of a system which would permit general creditors to win by voiding the sale
under§ 2-402(2) and non-Code law, but preclude secured parties from doing the same. Thus,
[t)he assumption that a person who takes an Article 9 security interest should not be
left in a worse position than if he had taken no Article 9 security interest at all,
suggests 1hat § 9-307(1) cannot be read to insulate a buyer who leaves goods in the
posr,ession of his seller from attack under § 2-402(2).
Jacl:son & Kronman, supra note 41, at 25.
194. Article 9 provides for a turnabout of priorities in several instances. Suppose, for
example, that a bona fide purchaser buys equipment subject to a perfected security interest
immediately following the equipment's removal from State A to State B. Absent a timely
refiling by the: secured party in State B, the secured party's initial priority over the buyer will
be lost. See U.C.C. § 9-103(l)(d)(ii); see also U.C.C. § 9-403(2) (change of priorities possible if
continuation i tatement not timely filed).
195. The principle at work is not, as Professor Dolan reasons, that the buyer takes less than
the 5eller had to give, see Dolan, supra note 6, at817, but ratherit is that the buyer forfeits what
was actually r1:ceived.
196. See Jackson Sc Kronman,supra note 41, at 25 ("[B]y acquiescing in [seller's] retention of
pos~ession, [buyer] may be deemed to have relinquished any 'priority' claim it might othenvise
have had undt!r § 9-307(1)."). Section 2-402 is not the only road to the buyer's loss of priority.
When the purchased good, left with the seller, is subsequently bought by another party,
U.C.C. § 2-403(2) may work to divest the first buyer of its interest in the good. See, e.g.,
Metalworking Mach. Co. v. Fabco, Inc., 17 Ohio App. 3d 91, 94, 477 N.E.2d 634, 638 (1984).
Moreover, U.C.C. § 1-103 offers courts the opportunity to fill whatever gaps are perceived to
exist in §§ 2-402(2) and 2-403(2) by drawing upon non-Code law, particularly the malleable
doctrine of equitable estoppel. An often guoted formulation of this dcctrine is the following:
Equitable estoppel is the effect of tlie voluntary conduct of a party whereby he is
absolutely precluded, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might
perhaps have othenvise existed, either of property, or of contract, or of remedy, as
against another person, who has in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has
been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires
some corresponding right, either of property, of contract, or of remedy.
3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISDICTION§ 804, at 189 (5th ed. 1941).
197. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 1-201(37) (true lease not subject to notice provisions of Article 9);
9-302(l)(d) (parchase money security interest in consumer goods can usually be perfected
without filing or possession); 9-304(4), (5) (certain security interests can be perfected for 21
days without filing or possession); 9-306(2) (in many instances security interest will survive
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doubt perceived as pragmatic compromise. But the cases do prove a
willingness to tolerate misleading appearances in the "right" situations. It is,
therefore, no solution to the problem of buyer status to say simply that the
buyer should be prevented from attaining priority because of the troublesome problems its secret interest may cause. The inquiry is whether this is
another proper situation for tolerating these problems.
Consider once again the plight of the retail financer who directly or
indirectly finances the buyer's purchase. 198 Typically, the financer demands
and expects to receive a security interest in the item that is effective against
third parties, including an earlier secured party with an interest in the
seller's inventory. This should be easily attained if the financer complies
with Article 9's attachment requirements 199 and the sale goes according to
plan. But it is precisely because not all transactions go according to plan
that a security interest is needed. Since things can go awry at any time, the
financer is necessarily interested in obtaining a lien and priority at the
moment the advance is made, which, quite frequently, predates the buyer's
possession of the goods. When this is the case, the financer's willingness to
participate will depend on the answers to two questions. First, will the buyer
have "rights in the collateral"200 while the goods are still with the seller?
Second, if the security interest can attach at that time, what priority will that
interest have relative to others?
To answer the first question one need only look at the flow of property
interests from seller to buyer that can pass irrespective of the physical
location of the goods. These interests include a special property interest201
and insurable interest,202 title,2°3 and the right to immediate possession.2°4
Surely, the existance of these rights must be sufficient to support an
enforceable security interest.205 With the seller's bundle of rights stripped
collateral's transfer to third party); 9-402(7) (security interest in collateral acquired within four
months following debtor's change of name will be perfected). See generally McLaughlin, "Seek
But You May Not Find": Non-UCC Recorded, Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests Under Article
9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REv. 953 (1985).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 46-54.
199. See U.C.C. § 9-203.
200. Before the financer's security interest can attach, the buyer must have "rights" in the
good. See id. § 9-203(l)(c).
201. See id. § 2-401(1).
202. See id. § 2-501(1).
203. See id. § 2-401(3).
204. See id. § 2-716(3).
205. The certitude of the statement in the text belies what is, in fact, a point of contention
among courts. Some courts have reached a conclusion similar to that in the text, see, e.g., In re
Pelletier, 5 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 327, 337 (D. Me. 1968); Re.x Fin. Corp. v. Mobile
Am. Corp., 119 Ariz. 176, 177-78,.580 P.2d 8, 9-10 (Ct. App. 1978); International Harvester
Credit Corp. v. Associates Fin. Servs. Co., Inc., 133 Ga. App. 488, 492-94, 211 S.E.2d 430,
433-34 (1974), while some courts have not. See, e.g.,In re Dennis Mitchell Indus., Inc., 419 F.2d
349, 356-58 (3rd Cir. 1969); Galleon Indus., Inc. v. Lewyn Mach. Co., 50 Ala. App. 334,
338-39, 279 So. 2d 137, 141, cert. denied, 291 Ala. 779, 279 So. 2d 142 (1973); First Nat'l Bank
& Trust Co. v. Smithloff, 119 Ga. App. 284, 288-89, 167 S.E.2d 190, 195-96 (1969); Evans
Prods. Co. v.Jorgensen, 245 Or. 362, 365-66, 421P.2d978, 980-81 (1966) (in bane). Contrary
viewpoints can also be found among commentators. Compare Anzivino, supra note 15, at 44-45
("It is this writer's opinion that possession is the second required element entitling the debtor
to rights in the collateral.") (footnote omitted) with B. CLARK, supra note 51, at 2-14 ("[I]t would
seem that the debtor has rights to a piece of equipment which he has purchased from a dealer
but which has not yet been delivered to him.") (footnote omitted).
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to naked possession206 the situation is conceptually no different from that
in which a true owner attempts to grant a security interest in an item
temporarJly bailed with another. No one would doubt the owner's ability to
do so even though the owner has temporarily given up possession. If this is
so, what sense does it make to deny the same power to an owner who has
yet to gain possession? To be sure, this does not reveal what rights must
flow to the buyer to satisfy section 9-203(l)(c), but it does indicate that
possession is not essential.
From the financer's perspective, knowledge that a lien can attach
without the need for the buyer to take possession is not comforting without
the corresponding knowledge that the lien will have, at a minimum, priority
over the seller's secured creditor. The lien will, of course, have priority the
moment section 9-307(1) applies. To forestall its application until the buyer
acquires possession would, as one court admonished, "make it impossible
for retail finance companies to do business with any dealer unless the
[seller's secured creditor] were directly a participant.... The proliferation
of papen10rk would be a giant step backwards in modern commercial
practice."l.'.07 In short, one has another "right" situation for suffering
whatever evils the seller's ostensible ownership brings.

C.

The Title Date

The choice of title as the determinate of buyer status is said to be
compelled by a combination of several of the Code's definitions: the section
1-201(9) definition of "buyer in ordinary course" comtemplates a "sale"
and, according to section 2-106(1), "a 'sale' consists in the passing of title
from the seller to the buyer for a price (Section 2-401)."208 The legitimacy
of this definitional piggy-backing depends on the tacit assumption that the
definition of sale in Article 2 applies equally to terms defined in Article 1.209
This assumption might be questioned. As argued above, the transportation
of definitions from one Code article to another must be made with
caution.2H• Even if transportation were acceptable in this case, perhaps one
should not overemphasize the appearance of "title" in the definition of sale.
206. If the seller has been paid in full, also lacking would be those rights that were incident
to the seller's lien in pre-Code days but are now the subject matter of the Code. See U .C.C. §§
2-507(2), 2-702(1), 2-703(a), (f), 2-705(1). Although a buyer with an insurable interest and title
wa~ hypothedzed, it is, nevertheless, possible that the seller still retains an insurable interest.
This would l:e the case where the risk of loss has yet to shift to the buyer. See Jason's Foods,
Inc. v. Peter Eckrick & Sons, Inc., 774 F.2d 214, 216-19 (7th Cir. 1985).
207. Chrysler Credit Corp. v. Sharp, 56 Misc. 2d 261, 270, 288 N.Y.S.2d 525, 534 (Sup. Ct.
1968).
208. See supra teKt accompanying notes 109-16.
209. Given this underpinning, it is understandable that Professor Jackson, once a supporter
of title as the test for buyer status, Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 23, seemingly
abandoned the title test for one that is not the product of such a mechanical analysis. See Baird
& Jackson, supra note 171, at 210-12.
210. See supra text accompanying notes 140-43. Before one argues that the Article 2
definition of sale is inapplicable to Article 1 definitions, one must be prepared to answer
Professor Smith's interesting riddle: "[W]hat happens to a term that is defined in Article 1 in
terms of 'sale' when it is applied in Article 2?" Smith, supra note 164, at n.88.
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It could be that its only purpose is to differentiate those transactions that

are within the intended scope of Article 2 from those that are not.211
On a purely textual level, other arguments have been made against
adopting a definitional solution that is itself entirely textual. One argument
follows from a comparison of the language of subsections 2-403(1)2 12 and
2-403(2) 213 and the other from a literal reading of section 2-403(2) alone.
The argument based on a comparison of the two subsections is that because
subsection (2) refers to the entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant,
and subsection (1) speaks of title, voidable title, and good faith purchasers,
the drafters meant for title to be material only to the operation of the latter
subsection.214 The second argument rests on the paradoxical situation
which would result if title were decisive. As described by Professors Peters
and Jackson:
Since an "entrusting" includes retention of possession without
title, it would be impossible for such an entrustee to pass title.
That is, if title were indeed crucial, no buyer in the ordinary
course of business could ever arise until after § 2-403(2) had
operated, which it could not do for lack of a buyer in the ordinary
course of business.21s
While these arguments may have merit, their persuasiveness is undercut by the same weakness inherent in the position they seek to counter, that
is, an overreliance on literalism. This approach is particularly inappropriate
in this case because the approach moves in two different directions. A more
fruitful inquiry would be to look at some of the broader policy implications
of defining buyer in terms of title.
In pre-Code days the concept of title served as the jack-of-all-trades in
sales law. One had only to decide who had title and then the answers would
neatly follow to such diverse questions as where the risk ofloss lay, whether
the seller could maintain an action for the price, whether the buyer could
replevy the goods, and whether the seller's or buyer's creditors could levy
on the goods.2 16 But for Karl Llewellyn the neatness of such a singularity of
issue was not worth its price:
The quarrel thus is, first, with the use of Title for purposes of
decision as ifthe location of Title were determinable with certainty;
and second, with the insistence on reaching for a single lump to
solve all or most of the problems between seller and buyer-and
even in regard to third parties.211
211. T. QUINN, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND I.Aw DIGEST § 2-106(A](l]
(1978); see also Note, Buyer-Secured Party Conflict, supra note 55, at 678.
212. For an overview of the text of this subsection, see supra note 20.
213. For the text of this subsection, see supra note 24.
214. Smith, supra note 164, at 61. But see Leary & Sperling, supra note 22, at 81 ("Section
2-403(1) does use the word 'title' ... but section 2-403(2) speaks of rights, not of title. Thus it
is not clear whether the question of title is 'covered by' section 2-403, nor that title is
material.").
215.Jackson & Peters, supra note 141, at n.163.
216. 1 N.Y.L. REVISION COMM'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 445 (1955). See
generally Llewellyn, Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond, 15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159 (1938).
217. Llewellyn, supra note 216, at 166.

566

463

IOWA LAW REl'IEVV

531

[1987]

Thus, when the drafting of the Code began, Llewellyn was convinced
that the time had come to scrap title as a means to resolve sales controversies. The unpredictability of application2 1s and emptiness of rational
content219 of title led Llewellyn to fear that if its then role of prominence
were enshrined in the Code the effects would be intolerable. As he saw it,
elimination of the doctrine was "one of the great clarifications that has been
offered to the law of these United States over many years." 220 Making the
most of their opportunity, Llewellyn and his crew of drafters made the bold
move of rdegating title to backseat status in the Code. 221 In its place are
specific rules premised on considerations peculiar to the problem at
hand.222 Gone is the one-issue-fits-all approach of pre-Code law. But the
drafters did not completely ignore the concept of title: Section 2-401
provides rules for determining who has title, if that matters. The preamble
to the section indicates the limited relevance of the section's rules. The rules
should be consulted only if a Code "provision refers to such title" 223 or
when "situations are not covered by the other provisions of this Article and
matters concerning title become material. . . ."224 The reference in the
official comment to the class of relevant title situations serves only to
remind one that title will no longer be used to solve sales problems. It still
may be necessary, however, to the application of various regulatory
statutes. 225

218. Llewellyn explained: "Nobody ever saw a chattel's Title. Its location in Sales [sic] cases
is not discovered, but created, often ad hoc." Id. at 165.
219. Refening to the concept of"title" or "property," Llewellyn fancifully wrote: "when, in
addition, 'the property' bounces around from party to party according to the issue, it begins
to look as if 'the property in the goods,' as an issue-determiner, were in the merchantile cases,
a farmer far from the dell, and none too well adjusted to the new environment." Llewellyn,
Across Sales or• Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REv. 725, 733 (1939).
220. 1 N:Y.L. REVISION Cow.l'N STUDY OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 160 (1955).
221. The unimportance of the location of title is a theme the Code's drafters thought worthy
of repetition. See U.C.C. §§ 2-401 & comment l, 2-505 comment l, 2-706 comments 3, 11,
9-101 comment, 9-202 & comment, 9-311 comment 2. Although most members of the
academic community were pleased with the Code's reformation of existing law, see, e.g.,
Corbin, The IJnifonn Commercial Code-Sales; Should it be Enacted?, 59 YALE L.J. 821, 824-27
(1950); Latty, Sales and Title and the Proposed Code, 16 I.Aw & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3-8 (1951),
there were those who were not. See Williston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial
Codi', 63 HAR'!. L. REv. 561, 562-72 (1950).
222. For example, the Code prescribes a separate set of rules on risk of loss, see U.C.C. §§
2-509, 2-510, buyer's right to replevin, see U.C.C. § 2-716, and seller's right to recover the full
price, see U.C.C. § 2-709.
223. U.C.C. § 2-401. Several Code sections, typically of little importance, do contain a
refC'rence to title. See U.C.C. §§ 2-312 (warranty of title); 2-326(3), 2-327(1) (incidents of sale
or return); 2-501(2) (seller's insurable interest in goods); 2-722 (cause of action for injury to
goods). U.C.C. § 2-403(1) (security of purchase and good faith purchase rules) is also a title
pro1•ision, but it is omitted from this list because of the relative importance of the section.
224. u.c.c. § 2-401.
225. Section 2-401 comment 1 provides:
This section, however, in no way intends to indicate which line of interpretation
should be followed in cases where the applicability of "public" regulation depends
upon a "sale" or upon location of "title" without further definition .... It is therefore
necessary to state what a "sale" is and when title passes under this Article in case the
courts deem any public regulation to incorporate the defined term of the "private"
Jaw.
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In concluding that the demise of title was an integral part of
Llewellyn's plan to rationalize and modernize commercial law, should one
also conclude that he and the other drafters would have wished the
invigoration of title by making a buyer's protection depend on having
received it?226 Although evidence suggests that the Code is not the panacea
Llewellyn dreamed it would be,227 other evidence suggests that the abolition of reliance upon title has been beneficial. Take, for example, the issue
of risk of loss. Once a frequent subject of appellate opinions, it now so
infrequently surfaces in print that its appearance is worthy of comment.22s

D.

The Identification Date

Of the four commonly discussed points along the spectrum for
defining buyer status, the most reasonable choice seems to be that of
"identification."229 Although the event of identification itself is independently insignificant,23o it becomes significant through the application of
various Code sections.231 In particular, identification signifies the moment
when the buyer acquires a "special property" in the goods.2 32 Unlike
identification,233 the concept of special property is not created by the Code,
but has long been part of the common law.234 The concept has traditionally
heralded that point in the sales transaction at which the buyer begins to
accumulate those rights that will eventually constitute absolute ownership

U.C.C. § 2-401 comment I. See State v. Delta Airlines, Inc. 356 So. 2d 1205, 1207 (Ala. Civ.
App. 1978) (§ 2-401 used to decide sales tax issue); Elliot v. State, 149 Ga. App. 579, 580-81,
254 S.E.2d 900, 901 (1979) (§ 2-401 used to decide criminal law issue).
226. Even absent the Code's formal de-emphasis of title, a title approach to the buyer status
problem is inappropriate for the same reason that all of the previously discussed tests are
inappropriate: use of a title approach is unsupported by any convincing transactional theory.
On the relationship between title and rational decisionmaking, see Dolan, supra note 166, at
1193 n.243 ("[the] buyers' and sellers' rights emanate from contracts of sale and Article 2, not
from metaphysical presumptions conjured up by freighted language."); see also Gordon, supra
note 40, at 587 (title approach objectionab1e because "it sets up an artificial barrier between the
analysis and the issue to be decided").
227. See generally White, Evaluating Article 2 of the Unifonn Commercial Code: A Preliminary
Empirical Expedition, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1262 (1977) (examining impact ofrecodification of sales
law under U.C.C. Art. 2).
228. Professors White and Summers note that a "cursory search" has revealed 59 pre-Code
risk of loss cases and a "trickle" of post-Code cases. J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMMERCIAL CooE, § 5-1, at 176 n.6, 177 n.8 (2d ed. 1980). For comments on recent risk ofloss
cases, see Frisch, Leary & Wladis, Unifonn Commercial Code Annual Survey: General Provisions,
Sales, Bulk Transfers, and Documents of Title, 41 Bus. I.Aw. 1363, 1380-82 (1986).
229. See U.C.C. § 2-501; supra text accompanying notes 118-28.
230. U.C.C. § 2-501 is primarily definitional. With the exception of equating identification
with a special property and an insurable interest in the goods, the section's basic purpose is to
prescribe when identification occurs. Id. at comment 3.
231. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-401(1) (title cannot pass prior to identification); 2-502 (identification, in part, conditions buyer's right to recover goods from an insolvent seller); 2-716(3)
(identification central to buyer's replevin rights).
232. See U.C.C. § 2-501(1).
233. Identification as a separate concept appeared for the first time in the Code. It does,
however, have its statutory antecedents. See UNIFORM SALES Acr § 18(1), 1 U.L.A. 8 (1950) (act
withdrawn 1962) (reference to "specific or ascertained" goods).
234. See Dolan, supra note 6, at 822.
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in the goods. 2J 5 This conceptual springboard, which takes the buyer from
a mere expectation of receiving conforming goods to a cognizable interest
in particular goods, is continued under the Code.236
Given the fact that the rai,son d'etre of the buyer in ordinary course
doctrine is the important economies that are achieved by making goods
quasi-neg<)tiable,231 one finds compelling the temptation to conclude that
whatever protection is afforded to the buyer was meant to begin when the
buyer's interest begins. No acceptable justification exists for forcing the
buyer to shoulder the risk of an innocent purchaser until the buyer is lucky
enough to have seen the transaction through to its completion.238 Furthermore, in :;ome cases, section 2-402(1) protects the buyer's specific proprietary interest in goods against the interests of the seller's creditors at the
instant the buyer's interest arises. 239 This, for some, reinforces the view that
the Code •:ontemplates identification as the event that starts to shift the risk
of the innocent purchaser from the buyer to others who deal with or claim
through the seller.240
It would be a mistake, however, to adopt this approach. While making
identification the reference point for buyer status would further the basic
purpose of the buyer in ordinary course doctrine, 241 it would also do so
when unnecessary and with anomalous consequences. For reasons that will
soon become apparent, a buyer's proprietary interest in goods needs no
protection unless the buyer also has a proprietary power 01;er the goods.

V. A SUGGESTED

TEMPORAL DEFINITION

This Article has looked at the several contemporary views of when
buyer status attaches and has found that each lacks a persuasive justification
235. ld. at 822-23.
236. See U.C.C. §§ 2-105(2) ("Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest
in them can pas5."); 2-501(1) (''The buyer obtains a special property .•. in goods by
idmtificatkn ... , . ").
.
.
.
l'he Codf· 1s silent on the nature of the residual property interest m the seller once the
special property is obtained by the buyer. There is only the noncommittal statement in§ 9-113
comment 4 that
[t]he ieller's interest after identification and before delivery may be more than a
security interest by virtue of explicit agreement under Section 2-401(1) or 2-501(1),
by virtue of the provisions of Section 2-401(2), (3) or (4), or by virtue of substitution
pursuant to Section 2-501(2). In such cases, Article 9 is inapplicable by the terms of
Section 9-102(l)(a).
U.C.C. § 9-113 comment 4.
237. See gmeral(v Hawkland, supra note 6 (discussing commercial law remedies for improper
tender of title to chattels).
238. The :;tatement in the text naturally assumes the unpersuasiveness of the argument that
ostensible ownership concerns are of paramount importance. See mpra text accompanying
notes 171-207.
239. U.C.G. § 2-402(1) provides: "Except as provided in subsections (2) and (3), rights of
unsecured creditors of the seller with respect to goods which have been identified to a contract
for sale are mbject to the buyer's rights to recover the goods under this Arricle (Sections 2-502
and 2-716)." See also infra note 261.
240. See, e.g., Dolan, supra note 166, at 1156.
241. Id. at 1157 ("By opting for identification, the Code appears to promote the interests of
buyers. In fact, it promotes the interests of a commercial society. It fosters sales. It encourag~.
buyers to buy and pay early.").
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for its adoption.242 But the separate criticisms heaped upon each fail to
suggest a convincing alternative. It is only when the deficiency common to
all accepted definitions is realized that the necessary materials for constructing a theoretically sound temporal definition become apparent.
Kwikset Division of Emhart, Industries v. Mohawk Industrial Design Enterprises (In re Pennsylvania Conveyor Co.) 243 may clarify the problem. Kwikset

had contracted to purchase a customized press from Mohawk Industrial
Design Enterprises, for a price of $69,375.25.244 When the press was
substantially completed and after Kwikset had paid $54,377.25 toward the
purchase price, the press was repossessed by Mohawk's secured creditor,
PennBank.245 Kwikset brought suit seeking possession of the press upon
payment of the remainder of the purchase price.246 PennBank argued that
Kwikset had no right of possession because the stringent prerequisites of
section 2-502 had not been satisfied.247
The bankruptcy court found for Kwikset.248 In so doing, it drew a
sharp distinction between rights under section 2-502 and rights under
section 9-307(1).249 Acknowledging Kwikset's inability to recover from its
seller under section 2-502, the court concluded that if Kwikset were to pay
the balance of the purchase price it would qualify for buyer in ordinary
course protection under section 9-307(1).250
The Kwikset approach illustrates how courts and commentators have
consistently failed to perceive the anomaly that one can be a buyer in
ordinary course absent the availability of a possessory remedy against the
immediate seller.25 1 Had Mohawk remained in possession of the press,

242. See supra text accompanying notes 131-241.
243. 31 Bankr. 680 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1982).
244. Id. at 681.
245.Id.
246.Id.
247. Id. at 682. Section 2-502 provides:
Buyer's Right to Goods on Seller's Insolvency
(1) Subject to subsection (2) and even though the goods have not been shipped a
buyer who has paid a pan or all of the price of goods in which he has a special
propeny under the provisions of the immediately preceding section may on making
and keeping good a tender of any unpaid ponion of their price recover them from
the seller if the seller becomes insolvent within ten days after receipt of the first
installment on their price.
(2) If the identification creating his special propeny has been made by the buyer he
acquires the right to recover the goods only if they conform to the contract for sale.
u.c.c. § 2-502.
248. 31 Bankr. at 683.
249. Id. at 682-83.
250. The court based its conclusion on notions of equity: "The purchaser in the instant case
paid all but $15,000 of the $69,375.25 purchase price, the goods were identified to the contract
and were left in the manufacturer's possession for the sole and only purpose of the making of
two minor corrections and the shipping of the completed article." Id. at 683.
251. Most courts never consider the link between a buyer in the ordinary course and his or
her possessory right against the immediate seller, but on occasion a coun will assen that no
such link exists. See, e.g., Carey Aviation, Inc. v. Giles World Mktg., Inc., 46 Bankr. 458, 460-61
(Bankr. D Mass. 1985) ("[Ilhe rights of a buyer against a secured pany are not determined by
the buyer's rights against the seller."); Wilson v. M & W Gear, 110 Ill. App. 3d 538, 540, 442
N.E.2d 670, 672 (1982) (noting that U.C.C; § 9-307(1) protects buyer irrespective of right to
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Kwikset, because it failed to meet the requirements of section 2-502, would
have been relegated to that hapless class of unsecured creditors for whom
full recovery is seldom a reality. Instead, because of the fortuitous circumstance of PennBank's repossession, Kwikset was assured the benefit of its
original bargain.
Another version of the same objection to the separability of a possessory rem1;!dy from the rights of a buyer in ordinary course views the
situation from the secured party's perspective. Before the repossession,
PennBank, not Kwikset, had a property interest in the press. 25 2 And
PennBank, not Kwikset, had the legal right of possession.253 But all this
changed once the right of possession was exercised. When PennBank
e:cercised its exclusive right to repossess the printing press, the exclusivity
of that right was destroyed. In other words, once a secured party with the
sole and {:xclusive right of possession repossesses the collateral, its right to
retain po:;session is lost. This is not only bad policy,254 but also logically
inconsistent255 and linguistically incoherent.
A second argument in favor of defining buyer status in terms of buyer
remedies is that such a definition, more than any other, comports with the
scope and purpose of the good faith purchase doctrine embodied in the
Code. Because the doctrine seeks to facilitate market trading by reducing
title uncertainty, its application is premised on the implicit assumption that
a point in the sales transaction has been reached at which the buyer has a
maintain replevin action); Gordon, supra note 40, at 575 ("[Ilhe rights of the buyer against the
seller's creditors should not tum on his rights against the seller.").
252. PennBank had a perfected security interest in all of the debtor's inventory, accounts
receivable, machinery, equipment, and proceeds. Kwikset, 31 Bankr. at 681. A security interesr.
is defined by the U.C.C. as a property interest. See U.C.C. § 1-201(37) (" 'Security interest'
means an interest in personal property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of
an obligation.").
253. Kwik:.:et, 31 Bankr. at 681; see also U.C.C. § 9-503 ("[U]nless otherwise agreed a secured
party has on default the right to take possession of the collateral.").
254. Remember that not all buyer in ordinary course scenarios involve a secured party. If
the contestant is an "owner" who has entrusted goods with a merchant having § 2-403(2)
power to transfer the owner's interest in the goods, clearly divorcing the buyer's rights from
the buyer's remedies is absurd. A court would be in the position of having to tell the owner that
what is his is his until he takes it. That is, while the goods are with the merchant, only the
owner has the legally cognizable right to remove them from the merchant's possession. Once
the owner has done so, however, the right to retain possession is subordinated to the then
superior po:;sessory right of the buyer in ordinary course. The result of this would be that the
merchant or seller who least deserves possession would retain possession. Because the owner
or secured party could be made to deliver the goods to the buyer, there would be little
incentive for either party to want possession. And the buyer cannot get possession until either
obtains pos!ession.
255. Professor Skilton makes the following potent observation:
But, you may ask, how may the buyer in ordinary course of business, with the seller
still in possession, assert his rights against his seller's secured creditor, if he does not
have property rights under sections 2-716 and 2-502? ... By an action based in
appropriate cases on conversion? By an equitable decree? The answer must be, by
some remedy under section 1-106(2) to carry out section 9-307(1). However, if the
court decides that he is a buyer in ordinary course of business without rights in
identified goods which are enforceable, the buyer is a man without a remedy until he
receiven delivery.
Skilton, supra note 14, at 20-21. Surprisingly, this excerpt indicates that Professor Skilton
seems to have begrudgingly accepted the inevitability of this state of affairs.
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title expectation needing protection. In assessing where that point lies, it is
helpful to think of a sale as the movement of a variety of property sticks
from seller to buyer. Absent a stick in the buyer's bundle that gives the right
to take possession of the goods, the state of the seller's title is immaterial. If
the seller breaches, the buyer's expectations are satisfied by an award of
monetary damages. If there is no breach, more sticks will come and the
cleansing of the seller's title can wait. The buyer's title concerns crystallize,
however, once the buyer obtains the legally cognizable right to compel the
seller's performance. It is with this stick in hand that the buyer's legitimate
claim to good faith purchase treatment materializes.
To see why this is so, one need only understand the Code's approach
to buyer's remedies. A central assumption of Article 2 is the homogeneity
of goods. If the seller does not deliver the goods, the buyer will, most often,
be able to obtain similar goods elsewhere. As a result, the buyer's expectation interest is fully vindicated by a damages award based on an imagined256
or actual substitute purchase.257 There are, however, situations, sufficiently
out of the ordinary, in which protection of the buyer's expectation demands
that the remedy be the right to obtain possession of the goods from the
seller. Thus, the buyer has the limited right to recover the goods in certain
insolvency situations under section 2-502,258 the right to specific performance under section 2-716(1),259 and the right to replevin under section
2-716(3).260

256. One Code formula for measuring buyer's damages is the difference between the
market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach and the contract price. See
U.C.C. § 2-713. The import of this remedy is that a market exists giving the buyer the
opportunity to enter into substitute transactions if the goods are still desired. If the buyer is
forced to pay more that the contract price, the excess is recoverable from the seller. While in
theory this calculation should put the buyer in the position he would have occupied had the
seller performed, in practice it may not. See Peters, Remedies for Breach of Contracts Relating to
the Sale of Goods Under the Unifonn Commercial Code: A Roadmap for Article Two, 73 YALE L.J. 199,
258-60 (1963).
257. A measure of damages more accurate than the speculative market price/contract price
formula is a calculation based on an actual substitute purchase. Section 2-712 permits a buyer
to "cover" by buying elsewhere and to recover from the seller the difference between the cover
price and the contract price. See U.C.C. § 2-712.
258. For the full text of§ 2-502, see supra note 220. The purpose of the section is to give the
buyer a right to the goods when, because of the seller's insolvency, a monetary claim would be
less valuable at best and valueless at worst. But the stringent requirements of§ 2-502 make the
section more a remedial mirage than a viable alternative to damages.
259. According to§ 2-716(1) specific performance is available "where the goods are unique
or in other proper circumstances." Apparently hoping to foster a liberalization of the remedy,
see U.C.C. § 2-716 comment l, the drafters offered an expanded definition of "uniqueness"
that takes into account "the total situation which characterizes the contract.... and 'other
proper circumstances'" that might include the inability to cover. U.C.C. § 2-716 comment 2.
Despite the ambiguity of the tests chosen by the drafters, the tests indicate that the remedy of
§ 2-716(1) was never intended to be available absent the buyer's actual or practical inability to
tap an alternative source of supply. For a valuable analysis of§ 2-716(1) and the buyer's right
of specific performance, see generally Greenberg, Specific Peiformance Under Section 2-716 of the
Unifonn Commercial Code: "A More liberal Attitude" In the "Grand Style,'' 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 321
(1982); Kronman, Specific Peiformance, 45 U. CHI. L. REv. 351 (1978).
260. Section 2-716(3) provides:
The buyer has a nght of replevin for goods identified to the contract if after
reasonable effort he is unable to effect cover for such goods or the circumstances
reasonably indicate that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been
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Observe the similarity of purpose between the good faith purchase
doctrine and the Code's possessory remedies. The essence of both is the
perceived utility of protecting the buyer's expectation interest. As a matter
of logical consistency, it is impossible to square this common goal with a
decision to withhold buyer in ordinary course status until some time after
the buyer becomes legally entitled to the goods. Odd indeed would be a
legal regime that bestows a possessory right to protect the expectation
interest but, at the same time, leaves that right unprotected because of the
inapplicability of a doctrine specifically designed to protect that very same
interest.2 61 Conversely, if one is unwilling to say that the buyer, not the
seller, has the superior right of possession, what justification is there for
terminating, in favor of that same buyer, third party claims to the goods? It
is this constant interplay between remedies and expectations that calls for a
definition of buyer status based on remedies. Only when the buyer's
expectation interest requires, for its satisfaction, an award of a possessory
remedy, should buyer status be recognized. 262

VI.

THE BuvER's PossESsoRY REMEDIES AND THE CouRTs

The previous section has shown that to effectuate the policy underlying sections 2-403(2) and 9-307(1), the rights of the buyer should tum on
the existence of a proprietary power over the goods. Only if the buyer can
compel delivery by the seller do the buyer's expectations justify the
elimination of certain classes of third party claims to the goods. Although
courts haw:! not explicitly decided buyer in ordinary course cases on this
basis, one might reasonably suspect that nothing would change if they
would hav.~. The factual denominators common to most of the decided
cases, the buyer's full or substantial prepayment and the seller's insolvency,
have long been thought to be of potential significance in determining the
buyer's right to take the goods from the seller.263 In short, the possibility
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security interest in them has been
made or tendered.
·
U.C.C. § 711)(3}. As with specific performance, replevin was never intended to be a
run·Of·the·mill remedy available to run·Of·the·mill buyers. It too presupposes some impedi·
ment to the buyer's ability to effect a replacement purchase.
261. Preventing this anomaly probably explains the presence of § 2~102(1). Neither §
2·403(2) nor{! 9-307(1) protects the buyer's possessory remedies against intervening claims of
the seller's unsecured creditors (presumably judicial lien creditors}, but§ 2-402(1) substitutes
for the good faith purchase doctrine a general right of recovery in the buyer. For the text of
§ 2-·102(1), Se·~ supra note 239.
262. The vii~wpoint expressed in the text is equally applicable whene•rer a rule oflaw secures
the buyer's purchase. For example, U.C.C. § 9-306(2) provides that a di>position of collateral
pursuant to the secured party's authorization terminates the security interest. One obvious
issue is the mf aning of the term "disposition." A disposition includes, as the subsection tells us,
a "sale" or "e1'change,'' but "disposition" should also include the moment a buyer becomes
entitled to possessory relief, although some courts have found to the contrary. See, e.g.,
Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'! Bank, 568 F.2d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 1978) (failing to give word
"disposition" any meaning independent of sale or exchange); Mechanics Nat'! Bank v.
Gaucher, 7 Mass. App. Ct. 143, 146-49, 386 N.E.2d 1052, 1055-57 (1979) (no "disposition"
without completed sale or right to payment).
263. See generally Horack, Insolvency and Specific Perfonnance, 31 HARV. L. REv. 702 (1918);
Ne\~man, The Effect of Insolvency on Equitable Relief, 13 ST. jOHN's L. REV. 44 (1938); Note, The
Effat of Prepa)ment Upon the Buyer's Right to the Goods, 37 CoLUM. L. REv. 630 (1937). In recent
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exists that the presence of this right has been both a necessary and sufficient
condition for a finding of buyer status regardless of the particular definition a court says it is applying. It is impossible, quite obviously, to test
accurately this suspicion, but one should examine relevant cases264 in which
the only issue for decision was the buyer's entitlement to a possessory
remedy. 255 Do these cases evidence an apparent pattern of recognition of a
possessory remedy factually coincident to the pattern that convincingly
suggests itself in the resolution of the buyer cases? An affirmative answer
would go a long way toward reinforcing the belief that the paramount
concern of courts in both lines of cases has been the protection of the
buyer's expectation interest and that that interest commands an equality of
protection irrespective of whether the buyer seeks a possessory remedy or
buyer status.
Consider Proyectos El.ectronicos, S.A. v. Alper.266 Proyectos had ordered
certain electronics equipment from Ram Manufacturing. The full purchase
price was paid and the equipment was segregated from the rest of Ram's
inventory. Unfortunately for Proyectos, Ram's bankruptcy occurred before
the equipment was shipped.267 Recognizing Proyectos' right to recover the
goods from the trustee in bankruptcy, 268 the district court specifically
considered the cumulative effect of prepayment and insolvency:
In this case Proyectos has already paid the debtor the full price for
the goods. To require Proyectos to cover would require it to pay
for identical goods a second time and then stand in line with other
unsecured creditors of the debtor, now bankrupt, with the illusory
hope that it would get reimbursed for the difference between the
cost of cover and the original contract price, plus the money
already paid to debtor. Such a result would not be in keeping with
the purpose of the Commercial Code to make a non-breaching
party whole.2 69
If it were possible to characterize the opinion in Proyectos as typical, the
inquiry would be at an end and one would be a bit wiser for having made
the effort. One would know that a buyer can establish a right to possession,
years, several commentators have rejected the notion that the drafters of the Code may have
made available the remedy of specific performance under the "other proper circumstances"
test of§ 2-716(1) to protect the buyer who has paid in advance. See Gordon, supra note 40, at
575-76 (viewing this theory as "difficult to sustain"); Speidel, supra note 41, at 286-87 (seeing
little support for this theory in view of§ 2-716's emphasis on feasibility of replacement rather
than commitment by the buyer) But see Peters, supra note 256, at 232-33 (suggesting that
"unique" can be read subjectively to take "into account the resources and commitments of the
party seeking specific performance.").
264. In order to maintain a factual harmony with the buyer in ordinary course cases,
relevant cases for present purposes consist of those involving contracts for single performances. Ignored are the othenvise important supply or requirements contract cases.
265. The remedy most often sought is specific performance. This results from the Code's
perceived liberalization of the use of specific performance and the inflexibility of the buyer's
other possessory remedies. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
266. 37 Bankr. 931 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
267. See id. at 932.
268. Proyectos asserted, and the court agreed, that specific performance was the appropriate remedy. See id. at 933.
269.Id.

574

463

IOWA LAW REVIEW

531

[1987]

at least against an insolvent seller, by showing a substantial prepayment.
The buyer in ordinary course cases could then be viewed as a reaffirmation
and extension of this principle, despite the dissimilarity of rhetoric, to
similar situations distinguishable only as to the identity of the party
contesting the buyer.
Although this logic deduces a pervasive judicial bias in favor of the
prepaying buyer, the deduction is premised on the typicality of Pro-yectos.
Yet, the majority of courts continue to couch their opinions on possessory
remedies in the traditional orthodoxy of uniqueness or peculiarity.270 The
fact remains, however, that prepayment and insolvency are recurrent
factual themes in most cases in which the buyer is, for some other stated
reason, awarded possession; and prepayment and insolvency are absent in
most case:; in which possession is withheld.2 71 Because this alignment of
result is not inevitable,272 the proposition that the buyer in ordinary course
and the right to possession cases are readily explicable as a consequence of
a preexistent bias is only tentatively offered. Yet, until courts articulate the
relevancy, if not the determinancy, of prepayment and insolvency, intuition
suggests that these facts have a part to play in determining buyer status, and
that the best guess is that they play the leading role.

VII.

CONCLUSION

The Code's silence on the temporal issue of buyer in ordinary course
status illuminates the drafters' failure to foresee that the critical moment of
270. See, e.g., Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1257-58 (5th Cir. 1977) (specific
performance denied; cotton not unique); Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp.
13;i4, 1357 (D. Conn. 1984) (specific performance granted; yacht was unique); Abbott v.
Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399, 404 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (specific performance
denied; furniture not unique); Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248-49 (Ark.
Ct. App. 1932) (specific performance denied; mobile home not unique); Gay v. Seafarer
Fiberglass Yachts, Inc., 14 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1335, 1335-33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(specific performance appropriate; yacht was unique); Stephan's Mach. & Tool, Inc. v. D & H
Mach. Consultants, Inc., 65 Ohio App. 2d 197, 201, 417 N.E.2d 579, 583 (1979) (specific
performance granted; machine was unique); Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 395, 498 P.2d
7•H, 748 (19'!2) (en bane) (specific performance granted; one-half interest in taxi was unique);
Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 712-13 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (specific performance
granted; Albert's Famous Mexican Hot SaUt:e was unique).
271. Compvre Weathersby v. Gore, 556 F.2d 1247, 1258-59 (5th Cir. 1977) (specific
performance denied; no prepayment) and Pierce-Odom, Inc. v. Evenson, 632 S.W.2d 247, 248
(Ark. Ct. App. 1982) (specific performance denied; insignificant [$100] prepayment) and
Tower City Grain Co. v. Richman, 232 N.W.2d 61, 66-67 (N.D. 1975) (specific performance
denied; no prepayment) and Scholl v. Hartzell, 20 Pa. D. & C. 3d 304, 306-09 (1981) (replevin
denied; insignificant [$100] prepayment) with Fast v. Southern Offshore Yachts, 587 F. Supp.
1354, 1356-57 (D. Conn. 1984) (specific performance granted; significant [$89,614] prepayment) and Tatum v. Richter, 280 Md. 332, 333, 373 A.2d 923, 924 (1977) (replevin granted;
significant [$15,000] prepayment) and Gay v. Seafarer Fiberglass Yachts, Inc. 14 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 1335, 1336-38 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974) (specific performance granted;
significant [$6846.00] prepayment) and Belleville v. Davis, 262 Or. 387, 399-400, 498 P.2d
74•l, 750 (Hl72) (specific performance granted; $1200 prepayment plus further monthly
payments) and Madariaga v. Morris, 639 S.W.2d 709, 710-11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (specific
performance granted; full payment).
272. See, e.g., Abbott v. Blackwelder Furniture Co., 33 Bankr. 399, •103-04 (W.D.N.C. 1983)
(specific performance denied; full payment).
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conflict over goods often takes place when goods are still with the seller.2 73
The unfortunate result of this lack of foresight is a judicial muddle that
shows no sign of abating. Reaching divergent conclusions, the many
opinions in this area are characterized by little judicial creativity and a heavy
dose of formalistic legal thinking. Overlooked is the common theme that
underlies both the good faith purchase doctrine and Code's approach to the
buyer's remedies: protection of the buyer's expectation interest. This theme
supports the conclusion that deciding when buyer status is attained is no
different from deciding when to afford the buyer a possessory remedy in a
case involving a recalcitrant seller.
Yet, one wonders whether this has not been the instinctive mode of
analysis being subconsciously applied by most courts. Certainly the courts
in buyer in ordinary course cases admit a policy preference for buyers. This
Article suggests that sympathies heavily slanted toward the substantially
prepaying buyer are also evident in those cases in which the contestant for
possession is the seller. Indeed, if this is true, then the fact of the buyer's
prepayment, and perhaps that of the seller's insolvency, take on a practical
importance that has heretofore been overlooked. Admittedly, courts'
traditional focus on result leaves the accuracy of this observation open to
question, but this fact does not mean that it is without value. Even if all one
has is an impressionistic picture of the relevant factors that underlie the
decisions, this picture is far better than none at all.

273. See Jackson & Kronman, supra note 41, at 25 n.104 ("Section 9-307 clearly did not
contemplate the problem of the financing buyer, who leaves the goods in the possession of the
seller. Rather, the situation envisioned by the draftsmen was that of a person who 'buys'
inventory and carries it off at the time of sale.").

